BugTraq
Cisco CSS 11000 Series DoS Aug 07 2003 12:39PM
S21SEC (vul-serv s21seccom s21sec com) (2 replies)
Re: Cisco CSS 11000 Series DoS Sep 07 2003 10:13PM
Mike Caudill (mcaudill cisco com)

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Hello S21Sec,

Apologies for our delay in response, but we have been thoroughly testing
and investigating this issue to ensure our response is accurate.

Normally, it is not our policy to comment on customer cases, however, since
this has been posted as a Security Advisory that contains inaccurate
information, we must respond with the correct details.

It appears that the original customer case was possibly misdiagnosed,
leading to the incorrect information in your advisory. Hence the details
on the mechanics of this attack are incorrect. We will only correct the
defect identifier, upgrade information, affected platform information and
workaround details here.

The upgrade listed in the solution section of the advisory will not provide
a solution to the problem stated in your advisory. We have been able to
reproduce a reload given the instructions in your advisory ONLY on the
11800 platform with a heavy storm of TCP SYN packets sent to the circuit
address of the CSS. This problem has been documented in CSCec01994. We
are working on delivering a fix for the specific problem (CSCec01994) into
the next 5.0 and 6.10 maintenance releases which will be available shortly,
possibly by the end of the month.

This problem is seen on the 5.0.2.03 and 6.10 Build 4 versions and is
specific to the 11800 platform. It does *not* affect the 11150 and 11050
platforms.

Using ACLs on an upstream router to protect the circuit address is
recommended as a prevention measure, or workaround. For example, the command

access-list 116 deny tcp any <circuit address of CSS>

can be used on an upstream router in combination with applying the
access-group to an outgoing interface to deny TCP to circuit addresses on
the CSS.

Thanks much for posting this information, although working with the Cisco
PSIRT in the future on advisories will eliminate this type of confusion and
inaccurate information.

We do greatly appreciate the opportunity to work with researchers on
security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to review and assist
with Product Security Advisories. Our ultimate goal is to ensure that
customers have accurate information on which to base upgrade and workaround
decisions and we welcome partnership with researchers towards that goal.

Thanks,

- -Mike-

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> S21SEC <vul-serv (at) s21seccom.s21sec (dot) com [email concealed]> [2003-08-07 18:30] wrote:
> ###############################################################
> ID: S21SEC-025-en
> Title: Cisco CSS 11000 Series DoS
> Date: 04/07/2003
> Status: Solution available
> Scope: Interruption of service, high CPU load.
> Platforms: All/Chassis CS800.
> Author: ecruz, egarcia, jandre
> Location: http://www.s21sec.com/en/avisos/s21sec-025-en.txt
> Release: External
> ###############################################################
>
> S 2 1 S E C
>
> http://www.s21sec.com
>
> Cisco CSS 11000 Series Denial of service
>
>
>
> Description of vulnerability
> ----------------------------
>
> A heavy storm of TCP SYN packets directed to the circuit address of the
> CSS
> can cause DoS on it, high cpu load or even sudden reboots.
>
> The issue is known by cisco as the ONDM Ping failure (CSCdz00787). On the
> CS800 chassis the
> system controller module (SCM) sends ONDM (online diagnostics monitor)
> pings to each SFP card
> in order to see if they are alive, if the SCM doesn't get a response in
> about 30 seconds the
> SCM will reboot the CS800 and there will be no core.
>
> By attacking the circuit IP address of the CSS with SYN packets the
> traffic is sent up to the SCM
> over the internal MADLAN ethernet interface. If this internal interface
> becomes overloaded
> the ONDM ping request and response traffic can be dropped leading this to
> an internal DoS
> since no internal comunications are available.
>
> Any attacker could do this externally with a few sessions of NMAP and a
> cable/ADSL internet
> connection.
>
>
> Affected Versions and platforms
> -------------------------------
>
> This vulnerability affects the models 11800, 11150 and 11050 with chassis
> CS800.
>
>
> Solution
> --------
>
> Upgrade to software release WebNS 5.00.110s or above.
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/contnetw/ps789/prod_release_note0
918
> 6a008014ee04.html
>
> AcL's to protect the circuit address are recomended.
>
>
> Additional information
> ----------------------
>
> These vulnerabilities have been found and researched by:
>
> Eduardo Cruz ecruz (at) s21sec (dot) com [email concealed]
> Emilin Garcia egarcia (at) s21sec (dot) com [email concealed]
> Jordi Andre jandre (at) s21sec (dot) com [email concealed]
>
> You can find the last version of this warning in:
>
> http://www.s21sec.com/en/avisos/s21sec-025-en.txt
>
> And other S21SEC warnings in http://www.s21sec.com/en/avisos/
>
> [ ----- End of Included Message ----- ]

--
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----
| || || | Mike Caudill | mcaudill (at) cisco (dot) com [email concealed] |
| || || | PSIRT Incident Manager | +1.919.392.2855 |
| |||| |||| | DSS PGP: 0xEBBD5271 | +1.919.522.4931 (cell)|
| ..:||||||:..:||||||:.. | RSA PGP: 0xF482F607 ------------------------|
| C i s c o S y s t e m s | http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

[ reply ]
Re: Cisco CSS 11000 Series DoS Aug 08 2003 05:51PM
Mike Caudill (mcaudill cisco com)


 

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