On Tue, 13 Nov 2007 13:07:02 PST, johan beisser said:
> Actually, that's not really part of the issue. The logs don't contain
> context, just who/where/when. While encryption will prevent (one
> hopes) the capability of recovering context, who you talked to is not
> kept private or otherwise secret.
It's probably a good idea to deploy encryption *now*, and use it for
*everything*, and be ready for when (not if) they decide to be more draconian
in their logging requirements. And yes, encrypt *everything* - that way you
make it a lot harder to do traffic analysis. If only the "interesting" 10% is
encrypted, they know which 10% are interesting connections, which may be as
important as the actual content.
> Actually, that's not really part of the issue. The logs don't contain
> context, just who/where/when. While encryption will prevent (one
> hopes) the capability of recovering context, who you talked to is not
> kept private or otherwise secret.
It's probably a good idea to deploy encryption *now*, and use it for
*everything*, and be ready for when (not if) they decide to be more draconian
in their logging requirements. And yes, encrypt *everything* - that way you
make it a lot harder to do traffic analysis. If only the "interesting" 10% is
encrypted, they know which 10% are interesting connections, which may be as
important as the actual content.
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