BugTraq
ACROS Security: Remote Binary Planting in Apple iTunes for Windows (ASPR #2010-08-18-1) Aug 18 2010 03:12PM
Mitja Kolsek (mitja kolsek acros si)
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PUBLIC

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ACROS Security Problem Report #2010-08-18-1
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ASPR #2010-08-18-1: Remote Binary Planting in Apple iTunes for Windows
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Document ID: ASPR #2010-08-18-1-PUB
Vendor: Apple, Inc. (http://www.apple.com)
Target: Apple iTunes for Windows
Impact: Remote execution of arbitrary code
Severity: Very high
Status: Official patch available, workarounds available
Discovered by: Simon Raner of ACROS Security

Current version
http://www.acrossecurity.com/aspr/ASPR-2010-08-18-1-PUB.txt

Summary
=======

A "binary planting" vulnerability in Apple iTunes for Windows allows local
or remote (even Internet-based) attackers to deploy and execute malicious
code on Windows machines in the context of logged-on users.

Product Coverage
================

- Apple iTunes 9.0.3.15 for Windows (at least XP, Vista and Windows 7)

Note: We only tested the above version; other versions may also be
affected.

Analysis
========

As a result of an incorrect dynamic link library loading in Apple iTunes
for Windows, an attacker can cause her malicious DLL to be loaded and
executed from local drives, remote Windows shares, and even shares
located on Internet.

All a remote attacker has to do is plant a malicious DLL with a specific
name on a network share and get the user to open a media file from this
network location in iTunes - which should require minimal social
engineering. Since Windows systems by default have the Web Client service
running - which makes remote network shares accessible via WebDAV -, the
malicious DLL can also be deployed from an Internet-based network share as
long as the intermediate firewalls allow outbound HTTP traffic to the
Internet.

A systematic attack could deploy malicious code to a large number of
Windows workstations in a short period of time, possibly as an Internet
worm.

Additional details are available to interested corporate and government
customers under NDA, as public disclosure would reveal too many details on
the vulnerability and unduly accelerate malicious exploitation.

Mitigating Factors
==================

- A firewall blocking outbound WebDAV traffic (in addition to blocking all
Windows Networking protocols) could stop an Internet-based attack.

Solution
========

Apple has issued a security bulletin [1] and published remediated
versions of iTunes for Windows that fix this issue.

Workaround
==========

- Stopping the Web Client service could stop Internet-based attacks
as long as the network firewall stops outbound Microsoft Networking
protocols. This would not, however, stop remote LAN-based attacks where
the attacker is able to place a malicious DLL on a network share inside
the target (e.g., corporate) network.

Other workarounds are available to interested corporate and government
customers under NDA, as public disclosure would reveal too many details on
the vulnerability and unduly accelerate malicious exploitation.

Related Services
================

ACROS is offering professional consulting on this issue to interested
corporate and government customers. Typical questions we can help you
answer are:

1) To what extent is your organization affected by this issue?

2) Is it possible to get remote code from the Internet launched inside
your network? Can this be demonstrated?

3) Have you adequately applied the remedies to remove the vulnerability?

4) Are there other workarounds that you could implement to fix this issue
more efficiently and/or inexpensively?

5) Are your systems or applications vulnerable to other similar issues?

Interested parties are encouraged to ask for more information at
security (at) acrossecurity (dot) com. [email concealed]

References
==========

[1] About the security content of iTunes 9.1
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4105

Acknowledgments
===============

/

Contact
=======

ACROS d.o.o.
Makedonska ulica 113
SI - 2000 Maribor

e-mail: security (at) acrossecurity (dot) com [email concealed]
web: http://www.acrossecurity.com
phone: +386 2 3000 280
fax: +386 2 3000 282

ACROS Security PGP Key
http://www.acrossecurity.com/pgpkey.asc
[Fingerprint: FE9E 0CFB CE41 36B0 4720 C4F1 38A3 F7DD]

ACROS Security Advisories
http://www.acrossecurity.com/advisories.htm

ACROS Security Papers
http://www.acrossecurity.com/papers.htm

ASPR Notification and Publishing Policy
http://www.acrossecurity.com/asprNotificationAndPublishingPolicy.htm

Disclaimer
==========

The content of this report is purely informational and meant only for the
purpose of education and protection. ACROS d.o.o. shall in no event be
liable for any damage whatsoever, direct or implied, arising from use or
spread of this information. All identifiers (hostnames, IP addresses,
company names, individual names etc.) used in examples and demonstrations
are used only for explanatory purposes and have no connection with any
real host, company or individual. In no event should it be assumed that
use of these names means specific hosts, companies or individuals are
vulnerable to any attacks nor does it mean that they consent to being used
in any vulnerability tests. The use of information in this report is
entirely at user's risk.

Revision History
================

August 18, 2010: Initial release

Copyright
=========

(c) 2010 ACROS d.o.o. Forwarding and publishing of this document is
permitted providing the content between "[BEGIN-ACROS-REPORT]" and
"[END-ACROS-REPORT]" marks remains unchanged.

=====[END-ACROS-REPORT]=====

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