BugTraq
Security Advisories Feb 03 2016 02:12PM
Portcullis Advisories (advisories portcullis-security com)
Vulnerability title: Multiple Instances Of Cross-site Scripting In Viprinet Multichannel VPN Router 300
CVE: CVE-2014-2045
Vendor: Viprinet
Product: Multichannel VPN Router 300
Affected version: 2013070830/2013080900
Fixed version: 2014013131/2014020702
Reported by: Tim Brown
Details:

The data supplied to both the `old' and `new' web applications (the device has two web based management interfaces) was permanently stored and could be retrieved later by other users. This is a normal feature of many applications, however, in this instance the application failed to restrict the type of data that could be stored and also failed to sanitise it, meaning that it could not be safely rendered by the browser.

Stored cross-site scripting could be triggered by:

Attempting to login with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>' (affects `old' interface and results in post-authentication cross-site Scripting when a legitimate administrator views the realtime log)
Creating an account with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>' (affects both `old' and `new' interfaces once created)
Setting the device's hostname to `<script>alert(1)</script>' (affects `old' interface once created)

A number of locations were identified as being vulnerable to reflective attacks, including:

http://<host>/exec?module=config&sessionid=<sessionid>&inspect=%3Cscript
%20src=http://localhost:9090%3E%3C/script%3E
http://<host>/exec?tool=atcommands&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WA
NINTERFACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&commands=%3Cscript%3Ealert%2
81%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
http://<host>/exec?tool=ping&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WANINTER
FACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&host=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%2
9%3C%2Fscript%3E&pingcount=3&databytes=56

The inclusion of session IDs in all URLs partially mitigates the reflective cross-site scripting but could itself be considered a vulnerability since it is included in referred headers and log files.

These are simply some examples of how this attack might be performed, and the it is believed that both the `old' and `new' web applications are systemically vulnerable to this.

Further details at:

https://www.portcullis-security.com/security-research-and-downloads/secu
rity-advisories/cve-2014-2045/

Copyright:
Copyright (c) Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2015, All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.

Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information.

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Vulnerability title: Remote SSL VPN Endpoint Identity Not Verified In Viprinet Multichannel VPN Router 300
CVE: CVE-2014-9754, CVE-2014-9755
Vendor: Viprinet
Product: Multichannel VPN Router 300
Affected version: 2013070830/2013080900
Fixed version: 2014013131/2014020702
Reported by: Tim Brown
Details:

In order for the hardware VPN client on the affected device to establish a VPN channel it connects to the remote VPN endpoint and initiates an SSL connection using TLSv1.1. It then initiates the following exchange (protocol version 2):

client> VERSION 3
server> ERROR
client> VERSION 2
server> +OK Protocol version 2 chosen
client> TUNNEL test
server> +OK Tunnel chosen
client> PASS test
server> +OK You are now authenticated
client> CHANNEL test
server> +OK Channel selected
client> DATA

The hardware VPN client does not validate the remote VPN endpoint identity (through the checking of the endpoint's SSL key) before initiating the exchange.

In this example, we perform a downgrade attack from protocol version 3 to protocol version 2, however as noted in the impact, version 3 of the protocol is similarly affected.

Note: MITRE have assigned CVE-2014-9754 to reference the missing certificate validation and CVE-2014-9755 to reference the protocol downgrade attack.

Further details at: https://www.portcullis-security.com/security-research-and-downloads/secu
rity-advisories/cve-2014-9754-cve-2014-9755/

Copyright:
Copyright (c) Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2015, All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.

Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information.

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Vulnerability title: Multiple Instances Of Cross-site Scripting In Viprinet Multichannel VPN Router 300

CVE: CVE-2014-2045

Vendor: Viprinet

Product: Multichannel VPN Router 300

Affected version: 2013070830/2013080900

Fixed version: 2014013131/2014020702

Reported by: Tim Brown
Details:

The data supplied to both the `oldâ?? and `newâ?? web applications (the device has two web based management interfaces) was permanently stored and could be retrieved later by other users. This is a normal feature of many applications, however, in this instance the application failed to restrict the type of data that could be stored and also failed to sanitise it, meaning that it could not be safely rendered by the browser.

Stored cross-site scripting could be triggered by:

Attempting to login with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>â?? (affects `oldâ?? interface and results in post-authentication cross-site Scripting when a legitimate administrator views the realtime log)
Creating an account with a username of `<script>alert(1)</script>â?? (affects both `oldâ?? and `newâ?? interfaces once created)
Setting the deviceâ??s hostname to `<script>alert(1)</script>â?? (affects `oldâ?? interface once created)

A number of locations were identified as being vulnerable to reflective attacks, including:

http://<host>/exec?module=config&sessionid=<sessionid>&inspect=%3Cscript
%20src=http://localhost:9090%3E%3C/script%3E
http://<host>/exec?tool=atcommands&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WA
NINTERFACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&commands=%3Cscript%3Ealert%2
81%29%3C%2Fscript%3E
http://<host>/exec?tool=ping&sessionid=<sessionid>&sourceobject=WANINTER
FACELIST.OBJECT__0&module=configtools&host=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%2
9%3C%2Fscript%3E&pingcount=3&databytes=56

The inclusion of session IDs in all URLs partially mitigates the reflective cross-site scripting but could itself be considered a vulnerability since it is included in referred headers and log files.

These are simply some examples of how this attack might be performed, and the it is believed that both the `oldâ?? and `newâ?? web applications are systemically vulnerable to this.

Further details at:

https://www.portcullis-security.com/security-research-and-downloads/secu
rity-advisories/cve-2014-2045/

Copyright:
Copyright (c) Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2015, All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.

Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information.

Vulnerability title: Remote SSL VPN Endpoint Identity Not Verified In Viprinet Multichannel VPN Router 300

CVE: CVE-2014-9754, CVE-2014-9755

Vendor: Viprinet

Product: Multichannel VPN Router 300

Affected version: 2013070830/2013080900

Fixed version: 2014013131/2014020702

Reported by: Tim Brown
Details:

In order for the hardware VPN client on the affected device to establish a VPN channel it connects to the remote VPN endpoint and initiates an SSL connection using TLSv1.1. It then initiates the following exchange (protocol version 2):

client> VERSION 3
server> ERROR
client> VERSION 2
server> +OK Protocol version 2 chosen
client> TUNNEL test
server> +OK Tunnel chosen
client> PASS test
server> +OK You are now authenticated
client> CHANNEL test
server> +OK Channel selected
client> DATA

The hardware VPN client does not validate the remote VPN endpoint identity (through the checking of the endpointâ??s SSL key) before initiating the exchange.

In this example, we perform a downgrade attack from protocol version 3 to protocol version 2, however as noted in the impact, version 3 of the protocol is similarly affected.

Note: MITRE have assigned CVE-2014-9754 to reference the missing certificate validation and CVE-2014-9755 to reference the protocol downgrade attack.

Further details at: https://www.portcullis-security.com/security-research-and-downloads/secu
rity-advisories/cve-2014-9754-cve-2014-9755/

Copyright:
Copyright (c) Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2015, All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.

Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. In no event shall the author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information.

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