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Multiple Flaws in Axesstel MV 410R
Jul 02 2009 08:49PM
filip palian pjwstk edu pl
Multiple Flaws in Axesstel MV 410R
by Filip Palian <filip (dot) palian (at) pjwstk (dot) edu (dot) pl
Axesstel MV 410R is a device offered by the two leading polish telecom
operators Orange and Polish Telecom to provide broadband Internet in
CDMA technology and it's already widely in use.
Axesstel MV 410R firmware and its default configuration has many flaws,
which allows remote unauthorized access to device and the internal
network behind it.
#1 Access from the Internet to device enabled by default
Anyone is able to automatically detect devices, which are online and
conduct the attack. It's simplified even more as the oparator IP address
space is reserved for the services using this device.
#2 No HTTPS support for the web interface
Communication to the web interface can be sniffed by the attacker.
#3 System doesn't force administrator to change default password upon
Many administrators leave it unchanged.
#4 Brute-force attack on admin account
Login attempts are not limited at all.
#5 Denial of Service
It's trivial to conduct a successful SYN flood attack from WAN and LAN.
#6 Wi-Fi encryption is disabled by default
Communication in the LAN can be sniffed by the attacker.
#7 SSID broadcast is enabled by default
Anyone can connect to the LAN without any problems.
#8 Input data validation
it in the browser allows for inputing malicious content.
#9 Executing CGI scripts via GET method
It is possible to pass parameters directly to the CGI scripts via GET
example execution of
confirmation not needed) will reset device to default configuration.
#10 Permanent XSS
It's possible to plant permanent XSS in the web interface using
#11 Automatic redirection
Some scripts do the automatic redirection after execution. This feature
may be used to hide for example a CSRF attack. evilsite.com leads to
"http://192.168.0.1/cgi-bin/wireless.cgi" where script is executed and
it autoredirects back to evilsite.com.
At the moment no fixes were provided by the vendor. As a workaround
#1 restrict access to device only from LAN
#2 change the default administrator password (still can be sniffed in LAN)
#3 enable Wi-Fi encryption
#4 turn on clients MAC addresses filtering
#5 turn off SSID broadcasting
11 V 2009: Detailed information with examples and PoCs sent to vendor
(cert (at) telekomunikacja (dot) pl [email concealed]).
12 V 2009: Initial vendor response.
19 V 2009: Question about the status sent to the vendor.
19 V 2009: No reasonable response from the vendor.
9 VI 2009: Question about the status sent to the vendor.
16 VI 2009: Notification that bulletin will be released send to the vendor.
17 VI 2009: No reasonable response from the vendor.
19 VI 2009: Last notification that bulletin will be released send to the
23 VI 2009: Last notification that bulletin will be released send to the
No response: "<cert (at) telekomunikacja (dot) pl [email concealed]>: host
mailin.tpsa.pl[22.214.171.124] said: 451 Unable
to contact LDAP".
25 VI 2009: Last and final notification that bulletin will be released
send to the vendor.
02 VII 2009: Security bulletin released.
The vendor hasn't responded neither responsibly nor reasonably within 34
working days. The bulletin was released in hope that users will be able
to protect themselves against these serious threats before vendor will
realese fixes and before the bad guys will reach them first.
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