Forensics
Re: Hardware Based Disk Encryption Nov 01 2006 03:20AM
Tom Stowell (jts deforest k12 wi us)
Pure conjecture: If they are storing a hash of the key/password (hard
not to), and using a secure algorithm (one would hope), then just wiping
the key/password should be sufficent to render everything else
irrecoverable. (For bonus points, store the key/password in flash. Good
luck recovering wiped key material from flash...)

Tom Stowell
Network Administrator
DeForest Area School District
520 E. Holum St.
DeForest, WI 53532
Fax: (608)-842-6545
Voice: (608)-842-6500
Email: <jts (at) deforest.k12.wi (dot) us [email concealed]>

console, n. [From latin consolatio(n) "comfort, spiritual solace."] A
device for displaying or printing condolances or obituaries for the
operator.
-- Stan Kelly-Bootle, The Computer Contradictionary.

>>> <bsmathers (at) reypd (dot) com [email concealed]> 10/31/2006 07:52:01 >>>
http://www.seagate.com/cda/newsinfo/newsroom/releases/article/0,,2732,00
.html

When someone gets a chance to play with one of these, please post.

An open and self-contained crypto infrastructure on a hard drive that
is "useless" until the BIOS recognizes it with a password key. Reminds
me a little of the "locks" some manufactures have that can be enabled in
the BIOS for some drives. Although, it is easy to just call up the
manufacture and get the back-door key for locked drives (done many times
with basic data recovery jobs or just hook up to another computer and
not boot from it), according to Seagate, there is no "back-door" access
here. If the key is lost, stolen, or just not available for
investigations/recoveries, there will be no way to access/read the FDE
(Full-Disk Encryption) drive.

Also, it has a "wiping" technique that supposedly can "wipe" a drive in
less then a second and be "secure". I would like to know more about
this. If anyone has any information, please post. Thanks.

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