Re-sending, because the first mail doesn't seem to have made it to the
list.

On 2008-03-31 Jason wrote:
>> What do you mean by "many vendors configure firewalls"? Any admin who
>> doesn't tailor his firewall configuration to the particular needs of his
>> network has already lost.
>
> Vendors have firewalls too. But what I mean is really many customers /
> vendors / admins / whatever.

Ah, I thought you meant "firewall vendors". Misunderstanding on my part,
sorry.

>> I call bullshit.
>>
>> a) A ping sweep isn't the only way to do network exploration. I'll refer
>> you to the man-page of nmap for more details.
>> b) You can't hide computers on the Internet. IP simply doesn't work that
>> way. Not responding to echo requests does *not* mean "host isn't
>> there".
>> c) ICMP doesn't care about ports. Like, at all. Thus a ping sweep is
>> entirely unsuitable to "find that server running on port whatever".
>
> Never said it was (??)

Then what does "finding a server on port whetever" have to do with a
ping-sweep?

>> If the host is supposed to be accessible: why whould you care about
>> someone discovering it?
>>
>> If the host is not supposed to be accessible: why is it accessible in
>> the first place?
>
> You can't hide them, but you can make them more difficult to discover
> by those who may wish to cause damage. And I said IF an attacker ping
> sweeps, I didnt say at all that it was the only way. Any attacker
> worth their salt will USUALLY find the hosts, but the idea is to
> reduce the possibility, not remove it.

That's just obscurity, which won't gain you any security. At all. Not
worth the time or effort you put into it.

>> ICMP is a protocol, not a service. And why would I care about "those
>> with malicious intent" finding a server that is supposed to be
>> accessible? Rather than wasting my time and effort on security by
>> obscurity (and not responding to echo requests is just that) I'd put it
>> into hardening the systems and exposing only those systems and services
>> that are supposed to be accessible.
>
> Security by design is always best, but hiding the presence of a device
> may sometimes be desired.

Again: that's just obscurity, which won't gain you any security. At all.
Not worth the time or effort you put into it.

> And hardening those systems is a process that RARELY happens
> unfortunately. If you harden the systems, good for you. But you'd be
> surprised how many do not.

Obscurity is NOT a replacement for due diligence. Which includes
hardening Internet-facing systems.

>>> Would you agree that opening ports that aren't necessary is a bad
>>> practice?
>>
>> Yes, because they increase the code base without serving a purpose, thus
>> increasing your potential risk of being exploited.
>
> Umm increases your code base? I could nitpick but I wont.

???

By running additional services you increase the code base that's exposed
to other networks.

>>> Then why open ICMP which also serves no real purpose for web
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>>> services?
>>
>> ICMP is still a protocol, not a service. And unlike unnecessary
>> services it has a purpose.
>
> I am not saying it doesn't again, its just not necessary.

As a matter of fact you *did* say it wouldn't. You even quoted the
respective part (underlined above).

[...]
>> And could you please explain why your infrastructure is exposed to
>> the outside in the first place?
>
> Layout of the infrastructure for secure internet access. If you want
> to nitpick, technically your external firewall(s) is/are part of the
> infrastructure.

External firewalls are exposed anyway (by definition). As are Internet-
facing servers. Your point being? You can't hide *and* expose a system
at the same time. Not to mention that IP simply doesn't have the option
to hide a system that's supposed to be accessible.

>>> Well MS hasn't been able to be pinged for x years, they seem to be
>>> getting along just fine.
>>
>> *sigh*
>>
>> Yeah. Except for everyone else who's trying to troubleshoot connection
>> problems to their servers. Bad practice doesn't magically become good
>> practice just because Microsoft does it.
>
> LOL a lot more sites than MS do it.

Repeating myself: bad practice doesn't magically become good practice
just because other people do it too.

[...]
>>> And when I, and I am sure many other technical people, can't ping a
>>> web site and response to it is very slow they don't throw their
>>> hands up in the air and say their servers are unreliable and they
>>> are breaking the Internet, they say that it is likely being blocked
>>> like most sites do, and try to use other means of determining the
>>> problem. Like using tcpdump or other monitoring and troubleshooting
>>> tools.
>>
>> You did not just suggest to use tcpdump instead of ping, did you?
>
> There are many ways to troubleshoot issues, tcpdump (yes, packet
> capturing) is one.

There are many ways to put a nail into a wall. Yet I'd still prefer a
hammer over an oscilloscope to achieve that.

> And you can ping a TCP port too you know.

Ummm... no, as a matter of fact you can't. You can try to establish a
connection to a TCP port, but that's completely different from ping.

> If ping is unavailable to test latency, there are other ways. I am
> suggesting options. And ping is not a must for all troubleshooting.
> I'm sorry but if an admin relies solely on ping to do trouble-
> shooting....

That's entirely besides the point. Of course I'll use other means when
one becomes unavailable. That is, however, no reason AT ALL to disable
(or unduly restrict) a valid and appropriate protocol for detecting and
troubleshooting network issues.

[...]
>>> Take a survey of security professionals and even the more seasoned
>>> network admins and ask how many of them depend on ICMP to determine
>>> if a web site, or ANYTHING, is up or not. I guarantee the answer you
>>> will get is: "I use it, but if it doesn't respond I use other
>>> methods because most vendors block ping to their web servers
>>> anyway".
>>
>> Ummm... yeah. So? That makes it a good idea how?
>>
>> And while you're taking your survey, ask the network admins if they'd
>> prefer ICMP enabled or disabled, and how they handle ICMP in their
>> own networks. I have a strong suspicion you'll get answers similar to
>> mine.
>
> I didn't ask what network admins 'prefer'. If a security professional
> just does what the net admins prefer, attackers would have a much
> easier life :)

Any "seasoned network admins" worth their money are also (network)
security professionals. You don't run a network without security
considerations. Not successfully, that is.

> Again, its not the end of the Internet if its disabled. And it doesn't
> confuse most admins when it is.

Which - of course - is not a valid reason to disable it.

>> ICMP does not increase your exposure. That's plain and utter
>> nonsense. Either your hosts are epxosed or they're not. ICMP doesn't
>> change the least about this. Security by obscurity will not help and
>> is not a replacement for actual security. What is so hard to
>> understand about that?
>
> It's not a replacement, I never said it was. You have to understand
> that security by design is sometimes not the way things are done, and
> I am being generous.

Well, I am not.

> And before you say how wrong that is, yes, you're right it is wrong.
> But its life. The idea is to minimize the exposure of a host and not
> affect required services or protocols.

*sigh*

Again: either a host IS exposed, or it's NOT exposed. ICMP doesn't
change anything AT ALL about that. It's merely adding some obscurity,
which you don't need if you have security in the first place. And if you
don't have security, then *that's* what you want to fix instead of
applying snake-oil.

> ICMP is not a required protocol for a web server, sorry. Convenient,
> yes. Required, no. If you believe it is then thats okay. That's the
> beauty of the Internet, everyone has an opinion.

So basically you're justifying obscurity instead of security, because
there are so many stup^Wintellectually challenged admins out there? What
kind of argument do you think that is? You do realize that this list is
about security, don't you?

Regards
Ansgar Wiechers
--
"All vulnerabilities deserve a public fear period prior to patches
becoming available."
--Jason Coombs on Bugtraq

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