Although we all know of anecdotal tales where a non standard port was used, or another minor change prevented some sort of mass issue, the fact remains that an automated attack such as that still requires an exploitable service. Changing the port in no way (except for permissions on *NIX) realistically affects the *ability* to compromise. It's a matter of weighing the needs of your specific environment and situation. Every situation is different.

In most cases if the port assignment is the only thing that would have prevented a compromise, you've already been compromised by your own mistakes. Security can't just be about keeping people out, it has to include mitigation for when somebody gets in.

Although let's be honest, we've all had that boss/executive who decided they know better than we do and been forced to implement crap.

Rob

Sent on the Sprint® Now Network from my BlackBerry®

-----Original Message-----

From: Dave Kleiman <dave (at) davekleiman (dot) com [email concealed]>

Sender: listbounce (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]

Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2012 17:51:54

To: security-basics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]<security-basics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]>

Subject: RE: server security

Tracy,

You would have to admit little layers of security, such as running non-standard ports, can protect you as in the Slammer worm. I am not saying that is the best or recommended solution to a problem, but it can work.

Respectfully,

Dave Kleiman - http://www.ComputerForensicsLLC.com - http://www.DaveKleiman.com

4371 Northlake Blvd #314

Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410

561.310.8801

-----Original Message-----

From: Tracy Reed [mailto:treed (at) ultraviolet (dot) org [email concealed]]

Sent: Friday, June 22, 2012 18:31

To: Tracy Reed

Cc: Dave Kleiman; security-basics (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]

Subject: Re: server security

On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 02:54:22PM PDT, Tracy Reed spake thusly:

> Many "little layers of security" just aren't worth it.

Clarification: Some "little layers of security" just aren't worth it.

Multiple layers of security certainly are.

--

Tracy Reed

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