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Focus on Apple
Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 25 2006 08:01PM Todd Woodward (todd_woodward symantec com) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 26 2006 04:14PM Philippe Devallois (phdevallois intego com) (2 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 27 2006 12:53PM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 27 2006 06:16PM Mark Senior (senatorfrog gmail com) (2 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 30 2006 12:24PM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) (2 replies) RE: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 31 2006 02:37AM rlandsberg (rlandsberg optusnet com au) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 30 2006 05:53PM Derek Chesterfield (dez mac com) (2 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 31 2006 10:38AM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 28 2006 04:45PM Jim Foraker (jf6b andrew cmu edu) (2 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Oct 31 2006 05:15PM Mark Senior (senatorfrog gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 01 2006 11:28AM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 01 2006 06:14PM Mark Senior (senatorfrog gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 02 2006 12:03PM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 02 2006 09:48PM Mark Senior (senatorfrog gmail com) (2 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 03 2006 10:36AM Simon Slavin (s slavin lancaster ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Security and Leopard (Mac OS X 10.5) Nov 03 2006 09:34AM Philippe Devallois (phdevallois intego com) |
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On 28 Oct 2006, at 17:45, Jim Foraker wrote:
> On 10/27/06, Mark Senior <senatorfrog (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
>> Since the point is to make sure this is Apple hardware, the key is
>> probably loaded from some obfuscated location in firmware. Once that
> Another option is that the key is in the kext and the kext has
> some other sort of logic for validating that the hardware is genuine.
> This would have the advantage of allowing Apple to have multiple keys
> and/or to change keys as they are discovered. Either way, once
> someone sits down and reverse-engineers the kext, the key is out.
My thought was that the key is stored in the TPC chip.
Then again, if it were, I have no idea how the generic X86 crowd have
managed to get Aqua running on non-Mac hardware! [since it supposed
to be impossible to retrieve keys from the TPC].
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