Even if your users do not have shell access kernel exploits can be
triggered through PHP system,exec.. and many other ways. Are you able
to run something like auditd(8) to monitor file access. It can incur
performance degradation but you won't run it forever anyway.
Ed <http://blog.eonsec.com>
On Jan 29, 2008 12:59 AM, Jeff Plewes <plewes (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> Update,
>
> The problem box:
> - centos 5 base, updated via yum from default repository.
> - httpd 2.2.3-11.el5_1.centos.3 (2.2.8 backport?)
> - php 5.2.5 compiled from source
> - courier-authlib 0.60.2 compiled from source
> - courier-imap-4.3.0 compiled from source
> - exim 4.69 compiled from source
> - proftpd 1.3.1 compiled from source
>
> I have no control panel of any sort installed.
>
> The box was running RH9.. had the issue.. formatted and replaced with
> fresh install of centos 5... copied over customer vhosts..
>
> Gets hit again within days.
>
> ports open = 20,21,22,25,80,110,143,443 + pasv port range for ftp
>
> I have many other hosts in the datacenter with various configurations
> but all would have had the same apache, php, ssh, ssl versions as this
> box before at RH9. None of them have been hit.. none of them however,
> contain exim, courier, or proftpd
>
> Im starting to lean towards these packages as a possible entry-point
> for the trojan?
>
> And no its not ARP or DNS poisoning nor router or proxy problems.
>
> -Jeff
>
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2008 1:00 PM, Cedric Blancher <blancher (at) cartel-securite (dot) fr [email concealed]> wrote:
> > On ven, 2008-01-25 at 13:31 +0100, Ronald van der Westen wrote:
> > > I don't think ARP cache poisoning is the problem here, unless client
> > > and server are in the same subnet.
> >
> > Not necessarily.
> > Sitting on one of them subnet is way sufficient. More generally, you
> > need to be somewhere on the path between your two targets to perform a
> > traffic redirection. As routers and firewalls can be poisoned as any
> > other node and as they act as gateways, they are all the more
> > interesting targets.
> >
> >
> > --
> > http://sid.rstack.org/
> > PGP KeyID: 157E98EE FingerPrint: FA62226DA9E72FA8AECAA240008B480E157E98EE
> > >> Hi! I'm your friendly neighbourhood signature virus.
> > >> Copy me to your signature file and help me spread!
> >
>
triggered through PHP system,exec.. and many other ways. Are you able
to run something like auditd(8) to monitor file access. It can incur
performance degradation but you won't run it forever anyway.
Ed <http://blog.eonsec.com>
On Jan 29, 2008 12:59 AM, Jeff Plewes <plewes (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> Update,
>
> The problem box:
> - centos 5 base, updated via yum from default repository.
> - httpd 2.2.3-11.el5_1.centos.3 (2.2.8 backport?)
> - php 5.2.5 compiled from source
> - courier-authlib 0.60.2 compiled from source
> - courier-imap-4.3.0 compiled from source
> - exim 4.69 compiled from source
> - proftpd 1.3.1 compiled from source
>
> I have no control panel of any sort installed.
>
> The box was running RH9.. had the issue.. formatted and replaced with
> fresh install of centos 5... copied over customer vhosts..
>
> Gets hit again within days.
>
> ports open = 20,21,22,25,80,110,143,443 + pasv port range for ftp
>
> I have many other hosts in the datacenter with various configurations
> but all would have had the same apache, php, ssh, ssl versions as this
> box before at RH9. None of them have been hit.. none of them however,
> contain exim, courier, or proftpd
>
> Im starting to lean towards these packages as a possible entry-point
> for the trojan?
>
> And no its not ARP or DNS poisoning nor router or proxy problems.
>
> -Jeff
>
>
>
> On Jan 25, 2008 1:00 PM, Cedric Blancher <blancher (at) cartel-securite (dot) fr [email concealed]> wrote:
> > On ven, 2008-01-25 at 13:31 +0100, Ronald van der Westen wrote:
> > > I don't think ARP cache poisoning is the problem here, unless client
> > > and server are in the same subnet.
> >
> > Not necessarily.
> > Sitting on one of them subnet is way sufficient. More generally, you
> > need to be somewhere on the path between your two targets to perform a
> > traffic redirection. As routers and firewalls can be poisoned as any
> > other node and as they act as gateways, they are all the more
> > interesting targets.
> >
> >
> > --
> > http://sid.rstack.org/
> > PGP KeyID: 157E98EE FingerPrint: FA62226DA9E72FA8AECAA240008B480E157E98EE
> > >> Hi! I'm your friendly neighbourhood signature virus.
> > >> Copy me to your signature file and help me spread!
> >
>
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