No, that's the only option at all. You can investigate as much as you
like, it's not a good idea to bring the box back online without a
complete re-install.
cheers,
Jamie
On 31/01/2008, Eduardo Tongson <propolice (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> Yes I agree that this is the only option when you do not have the
> resources or skills to investigate thoroughly.
>
> Ed <http://blog.eonsec.com>
>
> On Jan 31, 2008 2:15 AM, Jason Stelzer <jason.stelzer (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> > All bets are off because there is no way to conclusively prove that a
> > compromise stopped at a certain point. Best practice dictates that you
> > reimage the box[1]. The issue really is that nobody has complete
> > knowledge of everything. Any number of as yet unreported exploits
> > could have been used to elevate privileges for example. I'll go out on
> > a limb and claim that various blackhat communities know of exploits
> > that vendors and admins are as yet unaware of.
--
Jamie Riden / jamesr (at) europe (dot) com [email concealed] / jamie (at) honeynet.org (dot) uk [email concealed]
UK Honeynet Project: http://www.ukhoneynet.org/
like, it's not a good idea to bring the box back online without a
complete re-install.
cheers,
Jamie
On 31/01/2008, Eduardo Tongson <propolice (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> Yes I agree that this is the only option when you do not have the
> resources or skills to investigate thoroughly.
>
> Ed <http://blog.eonsec.com>
>
> On Jan 31, 2008 2:15 AM, Jason Stelzer <jason.stelzer (at) gmail (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> > All bets are off because there is no way to conclusively prove that a
> > compromise stopped at a certain point. Best practice dictates that you
> > reimage the box[1]. The issue really is that nobody has complete
> > knowledge of everything. Any number of as yet unreported exploits
> > could have been used to elevate privileges for example. I'll go out on
> > a limb and claim that various blackhat communities know of exploits
> > that vendors and admins are as yet unaware of.
--
Jamie Riden / jamesr (at) europe (dot) com [email concealed] / jamie (at) honeynet.org (dot) uk [email concealed]
UK Honeynet Project: http://www.ukhoneynet.org/
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