Not to drag this out further, and Brett is a friend of mine so I don't want
to sound like I'm disagreeing, but there's a significant distinction that
isn't in his article, and there is a small incorrect statement, as well.
Note: Guest != Guests
If you use the builtin Guest account and log on, this is what your access
token looks like (the guest account in this domain is renamed
"Administrator", which you can verify by looking at the SID of the account.
That was done for easy searches in auditing.):
User : SOMEDOMAIN\Administrator
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-501)
Owner : SOMEDOMAIN\Administrator
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-501)
Primary Group SID SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Users(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-513)
LUID for this instance of token 141654864
LUID for this logon session 140666464
Token is type PRIMARY
Token source is <User32 Äv>
Retrieving Group information from current process token
SID 0 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Users(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-513)
SID 1 Group: \Everyone(S-1-1-0)
SID 2 Group: BUILTIN\Guests(S-1-5-32-546)
SID 3 Group: BUILTIN\Users(S-1-5-32-545)
SID 4 Group: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE(S-1-5-4)
SID 5 Group: NT AUTHORITY\NONE_MAPPED(S-1-5-5-0-1406586)
SID 6 Group: \LOCAL(S-1-2-0)
SID 7 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
Privileges associated with this token (1)
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege - (attributes) 3
So, yes, if you use the guest _account_, the Authenticated Users SID is not
added to your access token. The _Users_ SID, however, is, contrary to
Brett's article, as is Domain Users. Since Domain Users are, by definition,
authenticated users, it becomes irrelevant that the Authenticated Users SID
is not in the access token. _However_, if you create an account, make it a
member of Domain Guests (and Guests, should you have the burning desire to
do so), _remove_ it from the domain users group, then log on with the
account, this is what your access token looks like:
User : SOMEDOMAIN\guestmember (S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-2611)
Owner : SOMEDOMAIN\guestmember
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-2611)
Primary Group SID SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
LUID for this instance of token 159218764
LUID for this logon session 153701964
Token is type PRIMARY
Token source is <User32 ÷s>
Retrieving Group information from current process token
SID 0 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
SID 1 Group: \Everyone(S-1-1-0)
SID 2 Group: BUILTIN\Guests(S-1-5-32-546)
SID 3 Group: BUILTIN\Users(S-1-5-32-545)
SID 4 Group: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE(S-1-5-4)
SID 5 Group: NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users(S-1-5-11)
SID 6 Group: NT AUTHORITY\NONE_MAPPED(S-1-5-5-0-1536850)
SID 7 Group: \LOCAL(S-1-2-0)
Privileges associated with this token (2)
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege - (attributes) 3
SeMachineAccountPrivilege - (attributes) 0
Note the membership in the Authenticated Users group and the inclusion of
that SID in the access token. I should have been very careful to note this
difference, but again, Authenticated Users _does_ include Guests. The rest
of Brett's article says the same things that I said in my post (right down
to the differentiation between the IUSR_ user and Anonymous Logon <G>).
I encourage you to duplicate my tests, as even though my testing has been
consistent, I'd like to see it validated by another.
Laura
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hall, Randy [mailto:randy.hall (at) intel (dot) com [email concealed]]
> Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 12:28 PM
> To: focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: RE: Bypass Traverse Checking?
>
>
> I thought I would weigh in on this discussion, mostly because
> I see some dangerous assertions being made.
>
> A very good web article that clears the distinction between
> Everyone, Users, and Authenticated Users is at:
>
> http://www.windowswebsolutions.com/Articles/Index.cfm?ArticleID=23581
>
> I read it and agree with its findings.
>
> Cheers,
>
> --R
> --
> Randy Hall MCSA, MCSE (randy.hall (at) intel (dot) com [email concealed])
> Network/Web Manager, Corporate Demos
> Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA USA
> All views expressed herein are MINE MINE MINE!!!
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Laura A. Robinson [mailto:larobins (at) bellatlantic (dot) net [email concealed]]
> Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 5:35 AM
> To: 'Shane Brooks'; 'Williamson, Scott'; focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: RE: Bypass Traverse Checking?
>
> As an additional item, since I've been challenged on this one
> via e-mail, I would encourage reading of this:
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/reskit/en-us/def
> ault.asp?u
> rl=/ windows2000/techinfo/reskit/en-us/distrib/dsbc_nar_lmxa.asp
>
> or
>
> http://tinyurl.com/4ubt
>
> Particularly this:
> "Note
> For anonymous access to be available for Internet users,
> anonymous access must be enabled on the Internet Information
> Services (IIS) Web server."
>
> Again, note that Authenticated users does _not_ include anonymous.
>
> Laura
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Shane Brooks [mailto:shane (at) floridacomputerservices (dot) com [email concealed]]
> > Sent: Monday, January 20, 2003 7:11 PM
> > To: Williamson, Scott; focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> > Subject: Re: Bypass Traverse Checking?
> >
> >
> > You should definately make this change. If anything, the
> > other admin is confusing Anonymous access of web-pages by the
> > IUSR_[computername] account. However, IIS manages the
> > password of this account automatically and the account is
> > therefore a member of "Authenticated Users", since IIS
> > authenticates every page as IUSR automatically if Anonymous
> > access is enabled. The only account that is affected by
> > Everyone is the guest account which is disabled by default.
> > Hope this helps, Shane
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Williamson, Scott" <scott.williamson (at) htcinc (dot) net [email concealed]>
> > To: <focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]>
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 15, 2003 1:10 PM
> > Subject: Bypass Traverse Checking?
> >
> >
> > > I'm working on procedures for servers in our organization. I keep
> > > coming across the recommendation to set the following on
> a Windows
> > > 2000 Server.
> > My
> > > problem is I have another administrator who believes this
> > could cause
> > > problems in IIS. What are the lists opinions? Anyone
> heard of this
> > causing
> > > problems?
> > >
> > > User Rights Assignment - Set "Bypass Traverse Checking" - Remove
> > > Everyone and Replace with Authenticated Users.
> > >
> > > Thanks in advance for your time,
> > >
> > > Michael Scott Williamson
> > > Systems Administrator
> >
>
to sound like I'm disagreeing, but there's a significant distinction that
isn't in his article, and there is a small incorrect statement, as well.
Note: Guest != Guests
If you use the builtin Guest account and log on, this is what your access
token looks like (the guest account in this domain is renamed
"Administrator", which you can verify by looking at the SID of the account.
That was done for easy searches in auditing.):
User : SOMEDOMAIN\Administrator
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-501)
Owner : SOMEDOMAIN\Administrator
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-501)
Primary Group SID SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Users(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-513)
LUID for this instance of token 141654864
LUID for this logon session 140666464
Token is type PRIMARY
Token source is <User32 Äv>
Retrieving Group information from current process token
SID 0 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Users(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-513)
SID 1 Group: \Everyone(S-1-1-0)
SID 2 Group: BUILTIN\Guests(S-1-5-32-546)
SID 3 Group: BUILTIN\Users(S-1-5-32-545)
SID 4 Group: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE(S-1-5-4)
SID 5 Group: NT AUTHORITY\NONE_MAPPED(S-1-5-5-0-1406586)
SID 6 Group: \LOCAL(S-1-2-0)
SID 7 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
Privileges associated with this token (1)
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege - (attributes) 3
So, yes, if you use the guest _account_, the Authenticated Users SID is not
added to your access token. The _Users_ SID, however, is, contrary to
Brett's article, as is Domain Users. Since Domain Users are, by definition,
authenticated users, it becomes irrelevant that the Authenticated Users SID
is not in the access token. _However_, if you create an account, make it a
member of Domain Guests (and Guests, should you have the burning desire to
do so), _remove_ it from the domain users group, then log on with the
account, this is what your access token looks like:
User : SOMEDOMAIN\guestmember (S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-2611)
Owner : SOMEDOMAIN\guestmember
(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-2611)
Primary Group SID SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
LUID for this instance of token 159218764
LUID for this logon session 153701964
Token is type PRIMARY
Token source is <User32 ÷s>
Retrieving Group information from current process token
SID 0 Group: SOMEDOMAIN\Domain
Guests(S-1-5-21-839522115-484763869-1343024091-514)
SID 1 Group: \Everyone(S-1-1-0)
SID 2 Group: BUILTIN\Guests(S-1-5-32-546)
SID 3 Group: BUILTIN\Users(S-1-5-32-545)
SID 4 Group: NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE(S-1-5-4)
SID 5 Group: NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users(S-1-5-11)
SID 6 Group: NT AUTHORITY\NONE_MAPPED(S-1-5-5-0-1536850)
SID 7 Group: \LOCAL(S-1-2-0)
Privileges associated with this token (2)
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege - (attributes) 3
SeMachineAccountPrivilege - (attributes) 0
Note the membership in the Authenticated Users group and the inclusion of
that SID in the access token. I should have been very careful to note this
difference, but again, Authenticated Users _does_ include Guests. The rest
of Brett's article says the same things that I said in my post (right down
to the differentiation between the IUSR_ user and Anonymous Logon <G>).
I encourage you to duplicate my tests, as even though my testing has been
consistent, I'd like to see it validated by another.
Laura
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hall, Randy [mailto:randy.hall (at) intel (dot) com [email concealed]]
> Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 12:28 PM
> To: focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: RE: Bypass Traverse Checking?
>
>
> I thought I would weigh in on this discussion, mostly because
> I see some dangerous assertions being made.
>
> A very good web article that clears the distinction between
> Everyone, Users, and Authenticated Users is at:
>
> http://www.windowswebsolutions.com/Articles/Index.cfm?ArticleID=23581
>
> I read it and agree with its findings.
>
> Cheers,
>
> --R
> --
> Randy Hall MCSA, MCSE (randy.hall (at) intel (dot) com [email concealed])
> Network/Web Manager, Corporate Demos
> Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA USA
> All views expressed herein are MINE MINE MINE!!!
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Laura A. Robinson [mailto:larobins (at) bellatlantic (dot) net [email concealed]]
> Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 5:35 AM
> To: 'Shane Brooks'; 'Williamson, Scott'; focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: RE: Bypass Traverse Checking?
>
> As an additional item, since I've been challenged on this one
> via e-mail, I would encourage reading of this:
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/reskit/en-us/def
> ault.asp?u
> rl=/ windows2000/techinfo/reskit/en-us/distrib/dsbc_nar_lmxa.asp
>
> or
>
> http://tinyurl.com/4ubt
>
> Particularly this:
> "Note
> For anonymous access to be available for Internet users,
> anonymous access must be enabled on the Internet Information
> Services (IIS) Web server."
>
> Again, note that Authenticated users does _not_ include anonymous.
>
> Laura
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Shane Brooks [mailto:shane (at) floridacomputerservices (dot) com [email concealed]]
> > Sent: Monday, January 20, 2003 7:11 PM
> > To: Williamson, Scott; focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> > Subject: Re: Bypass Traverse Checking?
> >
> >
> > You should definately make this change. If anything, the
> > other admin is confusing Anonymous access of web-pages by the
> > IUSR_[computername] account. However, IIS manages the
> > password of this account automatically and the account is
> > therefore a member of "Authenticated Users", since IIS
> > authenticates every page as IUSR automatically if Anonymous
> > access is enabled. The only account that is affected by
> > Everyone is the guest account which is disabled by default.
> > Hope this helps, Shane
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Williamson, Scott" <scott.williamson (at) htcinc (dot) net [email concealed]>
> > To: <focus-ms (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]>
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 15, 2003 1:10 PM
> > Subject: Bypass Traverse Checking?
> >
> >
> > > I'm working on procedures for servers in our organization. I keep
> > > coming across the recommendation to set the following on
> a Windows
> > > 2000 Server.
> > My
> > > problem is I have another administrator who believes this
> > could cause
> > > problems in IIS. What are the lists opinions? Anyone
> heard of this
> > causing
> > > problems?
> > >
> > > User Rights Assignment - Set "Bypass Traverse Checking" - Remove
> > > Everyone and Replace with Authenticated Users.
> > >
> > > Thanks in advance for your time,
> > >
> > > Michael Scott Williamson
> > > Systems Administrator
> >
>
[ reply ]