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Focus on IDS
Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 01:46PM Stefano Zanero (s zanero securenetwork it) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 02:04PM Tomas Olsson (tol sics se) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 06:08PM Joel Esler (eslerj gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 06:55PM Greg Shipley (gshipley neohapsis com) (3 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 08:29PM Martin Roesch (roesch sourcefire com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 26 2009 12:28AM Gary Halleen (ghalleen cisco com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 26 2009 08:14PM Stefano Zanero (s zanero securenetwork it) (2 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 29 2009 01:46AM Martin Roesch (roesch sourcefire com) (1 replies) |
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Privacy Statement |
>
> I respect the spirited and intelligent conversation here, but at the
> risk of sounding like a) an old guy that's been following this stuff
> for too long and b) a complete jerk:
>
> 1. IDS vendor / IDS software engineer / uber-geek view: "it's not
> technically a false-positive because if signature/ rule /
> pattern-match/ neugent/ whatever fired on x and it was programmed
> to identify q but you have to factor in y, and z, and..."
>
> <bang head here -----> X
>
> 2. Infosec operational person trying to do his job: "Was I attacked
> and was the attack successful? Yes or NO will suffice, thank you."
>
> I submit that for the vast majority of consumers of IDS technology we
> really only give a crap about #2. So if the device can give us a
> reasonably accurate answers to #2 we are happy. And if it can't we
> are unhappy.
>
> I think the fact we've been discussing these topics for close to
> twenty years now suggests that we aren't happy, but maybe I'm too old
> and being a jerk. :)
>
> My .01,
>
> -Greg
>
Hi everyone,
This is a cool debate. I submit that it is technically impossible to
build anything that will not 100% avoid "#2" false positives. I'm a
#1 guy myself; the only real "false positive" is the system telling
you it saw something, when that something actually never happened,
e.g., "IDS: I saw ICMP! User: There was no ICMP; your engine isn't
working properly."
For any case you develop that you think is absolutely, positively,
without a doubt an "intrusion" that you could identify with an IDS, I
can probably develop a case where that activity could turn out to be
legitimate, and therefore, in the eyes of the organization, a "false
positive."
I think the "IDS" has been misnamed from the beginning. (Blame Mr.
Anderson?) It should have been Attack Indication System or something
similar. After all "If you can detect it, why can't you prevent it?"
Now it's really time to "bang head here." :)
Sincerely,
Richard
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