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Focus on IDS
Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 01:46PM Stefano Zanero (s zanero securenetwork it) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 02:04PM Tomas Olsson (tol sics se) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 06:08PM Joel Esler (eslerj gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 06:55PM Greg Shipley (gshipley neohapsis com) (3 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 09:12PM Richard Bejtlich (taosecurity gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 25 2009 08:29PM Martin Roesch (roesch sourcefire com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 26 2009 12:28AM Gary Halleen (ghalleen cisco com) (1 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 26 2009 08:14PM Stefano Zanero (s zanero securenetwork it) (2 replies) Re: Snort with an expert system Jun 29 2009 01:46AM Martin Roesch (roesch sourcefire com) (1 replies) |
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Privacy Statement |
To the security or network operations people, all noise is a false positive.
They want the noise to go away. Marty's discussions on target-based IDS are
dead on.
This is an area where IDS/IPS products are evolving, and so are the
monitoring consoles.
You reduce the noise by:
1. Gain information about the target. Is it potentially vulnerable to an
attack based on its operating system and software installed on it? How
valuable is the asset?
2. Gain information about the attacker. Does it have a reputation of
attacking other systems, hosting malware, etc?
3. Correlate information on the monitoring console. Did an attack actually
reach the destination? Did it cause any damage? Did other devices between
the attacker and victim also see the attack? Did anything stop it?
Gary
On 6/25/09 11:55 AM, "Greg Shipley" <gshipley (at) neohapsis (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
>
> I respect the spirited and intelligent conversation here, but at the
> risk of sounding like a) an old guy that's been following this stuff
> for too long and b) a complete jerk:
>
> 1. IDS vendor / IDS software engineer / uber-geek view: "it's not
> technically a false-positive because if signature/ rule /
> pattern-match/ neugent/ whatever fired on x and it was programmed
> to identify q but you have to factor in y, and z, and..."
>
> <bang head here -----> X
>
> 2. Infosec operational person trying to do his job: "Was I attacked
> and was the attack successful? Yes or NO will suffice, thank you."
>
> I submit that for the vast majority of consumers of IDS technology we
> really only give a crap about #2. So if the device can give us a
> reasonably accurate answers to #2 we are happy. And if it can't we
> are unhappy.
>
> I think the fact we've been discussing these topics for close to
> twenty years now suggests that we aren't happy, but maybe I'm too old
> and being a jerk. :)
>
> My .01,
>
> -Greg
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