What Justice Brandeis called "the right to be left alone" is fundamentally opposed to the governments interest in surveilance, and was *meant* to be in fundamental opposition to the government's interest.

Those who are interested in securing this right should work on defense in depth. Make it the rule that private communications are encrypted several times, at multiple layers of the network. IPv6 encr., SSL encr. of HTTP traffic, TLS encr. of email transport, p/gpg encryption of email messages, encr. of all VoIP traffic. When these services are encrypted by default, at all levels of the network and application stack, the government's job is harder. When the trivial communications of average citizens are more like postal mail, which cannot be opened without a court order that ordinarily must be disclosed to the target of that order, only then will our technology infrastructure help defend the "right to be left alone" that Justice Brandeis so eloquently wrote about. Only when this support is at every level of the infrastructure will we not care if the government can sniff packets from our network/telecom provider.

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