Indeed - I agree that it needs to be verified by the voter before deposit; my apologies for not thinking and stating otherwise.

BTW, why not just have the printed version print the name of the person being voted for, with a bar code for that person next to the name?

That way, we don't have to worry about the whole chad thing, and even the sub-literate folk who 'accidentally voted for XYZ' (to take the Florida example) could see in big, bold letters exactly who they've just voting for, both on the screen and on the paper. OCR counters could possibly pick it up from there in lieu of bar code, provided the printed name is in a standard font, and is consistent throughout all US voting districts. I'd still feel more comfortable with some sort of bar code next to the names, though.

Each paper 'result' could also have a control serial number on it, so it can be recorded as spoiled if there's a screw-up whilst voting or a screw-up by the machinery (the 'spoiled' list can then be locked at the end of the election, with controls in place to prevent common cheats by any over-eager officials.)

No memory cards/sticks/etc needed, nothing to overflow, and more importantly, if something rbeaks, you'll know it immediately and can fix the problem on the spot, without worries of software manipulation.

/P

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