I don't think the logic is flawed at all.

If legal precedent has stated that a "search" by the police is well within their bounds by what they can see in "plain sight", then using a specialized technology to exceed the officer's natural senses exceeds the bounds of the search. Period. This is especially so in this case as there was no probable cause.

Mr. Rasch's application of this precedent to packet sniffing is on target as well.

Our government's attempts to install Carnivore within public data networks was an attempt to use a specialized sniffer to collect data from suspected criminals. The complaints by civil rights advocates of all shapes was that in its original form, it was too promiscuous and prone to misuse in many ways, but more poignantly, in the exact manner described in this article.

Searching for crime-related context from a promiscuous packet data sniff would result in multiple suspects, only one of which would be the target. However, given the precedent in question, it would not be out of line to have the LEAs pursue the target *and* those who were not intended to be targets.

The cry of most LEAs today, when collecting packet data is, "Just give us everything...we'll sort what we need."

If Mr. Rasch has erred in any way, it was by predicting what has already happened. Other than that, his argument is sound.

Taking this precedent to a non-packet data extreme, it'll be okay to collect hair, blood and urine for analysis by the portable test kits the police will have.

If you're clean, no problem. If you're not, well..."We're giving you a warning on the speeding, Mr. Smith, but we're arresting you for that nasty amphetamine habit that showed up in your blood results."

That'll teach you to speed on our nation's highways.


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