, 2005-03-16
It's a sad day when an ancient fork bomb attack can still take down most of the latest Linux distributions.
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silly article
2005-03-17
Anonymous (4 replies)
Anonymous (4 replies)
silly article
2005-03-18
Anonymous (1 replies)
Anonymous (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
Karyl Stein (1 replies)
Karyl Stein (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
Anonymous (3 replies)
Anonymous (3 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
Jason V. Miller (Author) (3 replies)
Jason V. Miller (Author) (3 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
mrsad (1 replies)
mrsad (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
Jason V. Miller (Author) (1 replies)
Jason V. Miller (Author) (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-18
Anonymous (2 replies)
Anonymous (2 replies)
simple fork bomb?
2005-03-17
Anonymous (1 replies)
Anonymous (1 replies)
simple fork bomb?
2005-03-17
Jason V. Miller (Author) (3 replies)
Jason V. Miller (Author) (3 replies)
simple fork bomb?
2005-03-17
Anonymous (1 replies)
Anonymous (1 replies)
simple fork bomb?
2005-03-17
Jason V. Miller (Author) (1 replies)
Jason V. Miller (Author) (1 replies)
Intended use dictates the limits
2005-03-17
Erik Keller (1 replies)
Erik Keller (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-17
Anonymous (2 replies)
Anonymous (2 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-18
Anonymous (1 replies)
Anonymous (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-18
Gentoo User (1 replies)
Gentoo User (1 replies)
Linux Kernel Security, Again
2005-03-18
Another Gentoo User (2 replies)
Another Gentoo User (2 replies)
Debian IS vulnerable!
2005-03-18
Anonymous (2 replies)
Anonymous (2 replies)
Linux only? perhaps across the board problem? Conflict of interest?
2005-03-18
glotfeltys@gmail.com (1 replies)
glotfeltys@gmail.com (1 replies)
Jason's opinion is too biased
2005-03-18
Anonymous (2 replies)
Anonymous (2 replies)
Take the first step author.
2005-03-18
EG (2 replies)
EG (2 replies)

And while I'm at it (dreaming about the perfect script, that is), it should, after asking the user of course, remove programs and services not needed for the intended use of the system, e.g. stop sendmail from accepting messages from the outside on a web-server.
Regarding casting this burden on the kernel. The fork/clone system call checks if the user-context does not exceed the set limits. They should be set accordingly, means to a sane value during installation. The question to be asked by the installation script should be worded like the questions asked during kernel configuration: "If you don't know what this means, accept the default."
Regarding "choosing usability over security". A built-in algorithm in the Kernel, stopping a user-context from forking based on system-load for example, could be used for a DOS-attack as well. The problem is a case of "do what I mean and not what I said."
my 2 cents
Erik
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Link to this comment: http://www.securityfocus.com/comments/columns/308/30994#30994