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Google Hacking for Penetration Testers |
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![]() By Johnny Long Published by Syngress ISBN: 1931836361 Buy Now! Published:December 1, 2004 Pages:528 |
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Locating Network Hardware
Its not uncommon for a network-connected device to have a Web page of some sort. If that device is connected to the Internet and a link to that devices Web page ever existed, theres a good chance that that page is in Googles database, waiting to be located with a crafty query. As we discussed in Chapter 5, these pages can reveal information about the target network, as shown in Figure 8.23. This type of information can play a very important role in mapping a target network.
Figure 8.23 Network Device Web Pages Reveal Network Data

All types of devices can be connected to a network. In Chapter 5, we discussed network devices that reveal a great deal of information about the network they are attached to. These devices, ranging from switches and routers to printers and even firewalls, are considered great finds for any attacker interested in network reconnaissance, but some devices such as Webcams are interesting finds for an attacker as well.
In most cases, a network-connected Webcam is not considered a security threat but more a source of entertainment for any Web surfer. Keep a few things in mind, however. First, some companies consider it trendy and cool to provide customers a look around their workplace. Netscape was known for this back in its heyday. The Webcams located on these companies premises were obviously authorized by upper management. A look inside a facility can be a huge benefit if your job boils down to a physical assessment. Second, its not all that uncommon for a Webcam to be placed outside a facility, as shown in Figure 8.24. This type of cam is a boon for a physical assessment. Also, dont forget that what an employee does at work doesnt necessarily reflect what he does on his own time. If you locate an employees personal Web space, theres a fair chance that these types of devices will exist.
Figure 8.24 Webcams Placed Outside a Facility

Most network printers manufactured these days have some sort of Web-based interface installed. If these devices (or even the documentation or drivers supplied with these devices) are linked from a Web page, various Google queries can be used to locate them.
Once located, network printers can provide an attacker with a wealth of information. As shown in Figure 8.25, it is very common for a network printer to list details about the surrounding network, naming conventions, and more. Many devices located through a Google search are still running a default, insecure configuration with no username or password needed to control the device. In a worst-case scenario, attackers can view print jobs and even coerce these printers to store files or even send network commands.
Figure 8.25 Networked Printers Provide Lots of Details

Table 8.10 shows queries that can be used to locate various network devices. Refer back to Chapter 5 for more conventional network devices such as routers, switches, proxy servers, and firewalls.
Table 8.10 Queries That Locate Various Network Devices
Device |
Query |
Axis Video Server (CAM) |
inurl:indexFrame.shtml Axis |
AXIS Video Live Camera |
intitle:"Live View / - AXIS" |
AXIS Video Live View |
intitle:"Live View / - AXIS" | inurl:view/view.sht |
AXIS 200 Network Camera |
intitle:"The AXIS 200 Home Page" |
Canon Network Camera |
intitle:liveapplet inurl:LvAppl |
Mobotix Network Camera |
intext:"MOBOTIX M1" intext:"Open Menu" |
Panasonic Network Camera |
intitle:"WJ-NT104 Main Page" |
Panasonic Network Camera |
inurl:"ViewerFrame?Mode=" |
Sony Network Camera |
SNC-RZ30 HOME |
Seyeon FlexWATCH Camera |
intitle:flexwatch intext:"Home page ver" |
Sony Network Camera |
intitle:snc-z20 inurl:home/ |
webcamXP |
"powered by webcamXP" "Pro|Broadcast" |
Canon ImageReady |
intitle:"remote ui:top page" |
Fiery Printer Interface |
("Fiery WebTools" inurl:index2.html) | "WebTools enable * * observe, *, * * * flow * print jobs" |
Konica Printers |
intitle:"network administration" inurl:"nic" |
RICOH Copier |
inurl:sts_index.cgi |
RICOH Printers |
intitle:RICOH intitle:"Network Administration" |
Tektronix Phaser Printer |
intitle:"View and Configure PhaserLink" |
Xerox Phaser (generic) |
inurl:live_status.html |
Xerox Phaser 6250 Printer |
"Phaser 6250" "Printer Neighborhood" "XEROX CORPORATION |
Xerox Phaser 740 Printer |
"Phaser® 740 Color Printer" "printer named: " phaserlink |
Xerox Phaser 8200 Printer |
"Phaser 8200" "© Xerox" "refresh" " Email Alerts" |
Xerox Phaser 840 Printer |
Phaser® 840 Color Printer |
Xerox Centreware Printers |
intext:centreware inurl:status |
XEROX WorkCentre |
intitle:"XEROX WorkCentre PRO - Index" |
Summary
Attackers use Google for a variety of reasons. An attacker might have access to an exploit for a particular version of Web software and may be on the prowl for vulnerable targets. Other times the attacker might have decided on a target and is using Google to locate information about other devices on the network. In some cases, an attacker could simply be looking for Web devices that are poorly configured with default pages and programs, indicating that the security around the device is soft.
Directory listings provide information about the software versions in use on a device. Server and application error messages can provide a wealth of information to an attacker and are perhaps the most underestimated of all information-gathering techniques. Default pages, programs, and documentation not only can be used to profile a target, but they serve as an indicator that the server is somewhat neglected and perhaps vulnerable to exploitation. Login portals, while serving as the front door of a Web server for regular users, can be used to profile a target, used to locate more information about services and procedures in use, and as a virtual magnet for attackers armed with matching exploits. In some cases, login portals are set up by administrators to allow remote access to a server or network. This type of login portal, if compromised, can provide an entry point for an intruder as well.
Whatever motivates an attacker, its best to understand the techniques he or she could employ so that you protect yourself and your customers from this type of threat.
About the author
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Johnny Long has spoken on network security and Google hacking at several computer security conferences around the world including SANS, Defcon, and the Black Hat Briefings. During his recent career with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), a leading global IT services company, he has performed active network and physical security assessments for hundreds of government and commercial clients. His website, currently the Internet's largest repository of Google hacking techniques, can be found at http://johnny.ihackstuff.com. Johnny is also co-author of the forthcoming books Aggressive Network Self-Defense, InfoSec Career Hacking: Sell Your Skillz, Not Your Soul, and Stealing the Network: How to Own an Identity from Syngress Publishing. |

