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BugTraq
A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 05 2002 06:44PM Michael Howard (mikehow microsoft com) (3 replies) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 11 2002 06:19PM Jeremiah Grossman (jeremiah whitehatsec com) (1 replies) RE: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 12 2002 12:46AM Jason Coombs (jasonc science org) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 07 2002 08:26PM Justin King (justin othius com) (1 replies) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 10 2002 03:21AM Ulf Harnhammar (ulfh update uu se) (2 replies) RE: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 12 2002 10:43AM jasonk (jasonk swin edu au) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 05 2002 09:38PM Florian Weimer (Weimer CERT Uni-Stuttgart DE) (2 replies) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 08 2002 04:23AM daw mozart cs berkeley edu (David Wagner) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 06 2002 05:16AM Valdis Kletnieks vt edu (1 replies) Re: A technique to mitigate cookie-stealing XSS attacks Nov 08 2002 10:12AM Florian Weimer (Weimer CERT Uni-Stuttgart DE) |
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> On Thu, 7 Nov 2002, Justin King wrote:
>
> > I would be very interested in major browsers supporting a <dead> tag with an
> > optional parameter to be a hash of the data between the opening and closing
> > dead tag. This tag would indicate that no "live" elements of HTML be
> > supported (e.g., JavaScript, VBScript, embed, object).
>
> I'm not sure if that's the best solution. Lots of code out there do much
> less filtering than it should, so there will probably be a way to include
> a </dead> tag and then use all the usual XSS tricks.
Amending Justin's suggestion to _require_ a parameter would likely be
sufficient:
<dead uniq="7f7a2eb8d3adde08f37f22645cb2853e">
[insert nasty javascript, XSS, etc]
</dead uniq="7f7a2eb8d3adde08f37f22645cb2853e">
If the two tags don't match, the browser continues to enforce the 'dead'
sections of code. Any browser supporting such a dead tag could similarly
require the matching uniqueness tag -- since we are inventing such a tag,
browsers implementing it have a chance to get it correct. :)
(Of course, any content that supplies static tags is doomed -- the
uniquness tags need to be random enough to prevent guessing by a
dedicated attacker -- or at least sufficiently random to require
attackers to be dedicated.)
--
http://immunix.org/
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