Jason Coombs propagated the following meme:
>
> As of now we don't know who wrote the worm, but we do know that it looks
> like a concept worm with no malicious payload. There is a good argument to
> be made in favor of such worms.

There are many arguments against them, too.

1) They have the potential to seriously disrupt delivery of important
services.

2) It takes one bug in the worm to turn it from "mostly harmless" into
"crippling", and nobody has a spare Internet to test a worm on
before releasing it.

3) They cause enormous problems even for those who are not directly
to blame. Consider a co-location. You can keep your own systems
up to date, but that's really no consolation if some idiot in the
same facility hasn't patched their SQL Server boxen, and they melt
the router.

4) They feed a cycle of short, sensationalist incidents that target a
single vulnerability, and then fade into the background.

5) It feeds the myth that it is "good enough" to be reactive when it
comes to security.

6) It has no appreciable long-term benefit. Last year, it was Code Red
and Nimda. Everyone patched their IIS servers. There was the Apache
mod_ssl worm (to a lesser extent) that reminded everyone to patch
their Apache servers. This year, there's Sapphire, and everyone patches
their SQL Server boxes. Next vulnerability, next worm, even if it's in
IIS, Apache or SQL Server again, will catch the _same_ people, _again_.

The solution isn't defensive worms. The solution lies in the recognition
(seldom expressed, lest we later regret it ourselves), that the failure
to patch a seven-month bug is NEGLIGENCE, the failure to firewall non-
essential open ports on network servers is NEGLIGENCE. In other matters,
the failure to implement egress filtering is negligence. We could
probably come up with a pretty good baseline of what is obvious systems
administration negligence when it comes to security.

Few worms exploit vulnerabilities that are new and unknown. Most exploit
those that have been known for months. That it is cheaper for negligent
administrators to wait until the worm hits, suffer a day of disruption
and then fix the problem du jour is simply unacceptable. The only solution,
however, is to somehow make it more expensive to be negligent than it is
to be diligent.

This is difficult. Tort law really isn't very good at handling cases where
a lot of people each do small amounts of damage to a lot of other people.
Even though the aggregate effect is significant, you can't really put your
finger quite firmly enough on who did what to whom. And since the Internet
is decentralised, you can't be slapped down by some authority in charge of
keeping the 'net healthy.

There's always the doomsday scenario. Maybe if this worm had caused major
data-loss, there _would_ be some lasting effect? Or maybe the admins would
have just restored from backup. Who knows?

Charles Miller

--
"Bill Gates reports on security progress made and the challenges ahead."
-- Microsoft's Homepage, on the day an SQL Server bug crippled large
sections of the Internet.

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