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BugTraq
Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 05:08AM David Litchfield (david ngssoftware com) (7 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 05 2003 01:41PM dullien gmx de (1 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 10:52PM David Litchfield (david ngssoftware com) (2 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 02:00PM sd hysteria sk (1 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 11:20PM David Litchfield (david ngssoftware com) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 02:00PM Torbjörn Hovmark (torbjorn hovmark abtrusion com) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 11:38AM Charlie Root (weedpower home ro) (4 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 06 2003 01:00AM Deus, Attonbitus (Thor HammerofGod com) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 08:08PM Brian Hatch (bugtraq ifokr org) (2 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 05:26PM Alan DeKok (aland freeradius org) (2 replies) Re: Can't Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 05 2003 10:06AM bugtraq gaza halo nu (2 replies) Observation on randomization/rebiasing... Feb 05 2003 09:10PM Nicholas Weaver (nweaver CS berkeley edu) (1 replies) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 06:38PM David Litchfield (david ngssoftware com) (1 replies) Re: [VulnDiscuss] Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 05 2003 05:32PM Halvar Flake (halvar gmx net) Re: Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 04 2003 11:34AM Eugene Tsyrklevich (eugene securityarchitects com) Re: [VulnDiscuss] Preventing exploitation with rebasing Feb 03 2003 09:49PM Michal Zalewski (lcamtuf coredump cx) |
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Privacy Statement |
(1) other people's compiled code
(2) other people's source code
(3) your own code
Points:
A. There are better things to do in the case of (2) and (3) than rebase the
binary.
B. In the case of (1) rebasing offers some value in certain circumstances,
particularly if you have access to the source (2) -- in which case point A
applies and you shouldn't bother with rebasing somebody else's binary.
Rebase the entire build, and throw in a boatload of NOPs and other
spaghetti. The less predictable your binaries are from the perspective of a
remote attacker, the better.
C. Remember the threat: uncontrolled/arbitrary remote procedure calls. Don't
let them happen in the first place. Authenticate every caller. Filter and
block all anonymous callers. Stop the bits from entering your box (or
process space) in the first place.
D. Don't allow compiled code to execute on your box unless it has been
authorized to execute in advance based on its hash code.
E. If code is vulnerable, don't use it.
Jason Coombs
jasonc (at) science (dot) org [email concealed]
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