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BugTraq
sendmail 8.12.8 available Mar 03 2003 05:08PM Claus Assmann ca+bugtraq@sendmail.org (ca+bugtraq sendmail org) (2 replies) Re: sendmail 8.12.8 available Mar 04 2003 01:39AM Mordechai T. Abzug (morty frakir org) (1 replies) Re: sendmail 8.12.8 available Mar 04 2003 11:14PM Neil W Rickert rickert+bt (at) cs.niu (dot) edu [email concealed] (rickert+bt cs niu edu) Re: sendmail 8.12.8 available Mar 03 2003 05:26PM Florian Weimer (Weimer CERT Uni-Stuttgart DE) (1 replies) |
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Privacy Statement |
> Claus Assmann <ca+bugtraq (at) sendmail (dot) org [email concealed]> writes:
>
>
>>Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the availability
>>of sendmail 8.12.8. It contains a fix for a critical security
>>problem discovered by Mark Dowd of ISS X-Force; we thank ISS X-Force
>>for bringing this problem to our attention. Sendmail urges all users to
>>either upgrade to sendmail 8.12.8 or apply the patch for 8.12 that
>>is part of this announcement.
>
>
> Would people be willing to share filter rules for other MTAs to block
> offending messages on relays?
>
> Thanks,
I'm not sure how the exploit works, but if I understood the LSD-analysis
correctly, it uses the comment for the payload, and needs many <> in a
parsed header. With exim4, this ACL should/could help.
First it checks for the header-syntax, that will reject the <><><><>
used in the LSD-POC-code. The second condition should refuse to accept
comments longer than 20 chars.
acl_data = check_message
check_message:
require message = Invalid header syntax (Maybe sendmail exploit)
verify = header_syntax
deny message = Ohh, this looks like the sendmail-exploit
condition = ${if match {$h_from: $h_cc: $h_bcc: $h_reply_to: $h_sender: $h_to:} {\N\(.{21,}?\)\N}{1}{0}}
No warranty ;)
Nico Erfurth
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