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BugTraq
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 05:26PM Mariusz Woloszyn (emsi ipartners pl) (6 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 11:27PM Shaun Clowes (shaun securereality com au) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 15 2003 06:48PM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 17 2003 11:09PM Shaun Clowes (shaun securereality com au) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 17 2003 10:42PM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (2 replies) Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness Aug 21 2003 02:00AM Bob Rogers (rogers-bt2 rgrjr dyndns org) (1 replies) Re: Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness Aug 22 2003 03:56AM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (1 replies) Re: Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness Aug 22 2003 06:21PM Nicholas Weaver (nweaver CS berkeley edu) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 18 2003 06:07PM Mark Handley (M Handley cs ucl ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 07:37PM Theo de Raadt (deraadt cvs openbsd org) (3 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 09:14PM Gerhard Strangar (gerhard brue net) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 09:43PM Theo de Raadt (deraadt cvs openbsd org) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 06:47PM Jedi/Sector One (j pureftpd org) (2 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 15 2003 09:41AM Peter Busser (peter trusteddebian org) (2 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 16 2003 01:36AM Mark Tinberg (mtinberg securepipe com) (2 replies) |
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Privacy Statement |
wrote:
> On Thu, 14 Aug 2003, Stephen Clowater wrote:
>
>> Also, you can use chpax, and turn on a non-executable stack, and with
>> a small
> It's been proved many times that non-executable stack adds NO security
> at
> all.
> Every single class of vulnerabilities exploitable with executable stack
> can be also exploited with non-executable stack.
What he forgot to mention is that PAX and grsec also gives you
non-executable heap and randomized address bases to prevent
return-to-libc attacks. AFAIK all those combined do bring real security
against generic exploits.
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