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BugTraq
Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 18 2003 03:24PM Balwinder Singh (balwinder gmx net) (5 replies) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 16 2003 09:12AM Stefano Zanero (stefano zanero ieee org) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 15 2003 10:01PM Alaric B Snell (alaric alaric-snell com) (1 replies) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 18 2003 04:18PM Anil Madhavapeddy (anil recoil org) (1 replies) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 20 2003 05:31PM ari (edelkind-bugtraq episec com) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 15 2003 07:56PM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 15 2003 07:14PM Clifton Royston (cliftonr lava net) (1 replies) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 20 2003 08:04PM Balwinder Singh (balwinder gmx net) (1 replies) Re: Need help. Proof of concept 100% security. Aug 19 2003 01:16AM Kyle Roger Hofmann (krhofman umich edu) |
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Privacy Statement |
On Mon, Aug 18, 2003 at 08:54:54PM +0530, Balwinder Singh composed:
> Hi All,
>
> I have developed an application, which I believe can provide 100%
> security against various attacks.I can hear people laughing. Hmm..
> The applications is called Execution Flow Control (EFC).
> Details of software can be found at http://203.197.88.14/efc
You are doing system call monitoring based on a program model, and
killing programs which deviate, assuming I read the documentation
correctly...
A: You have false positives unless you generate this database through
program analysis or some other technique. "Security" procedures which
make systems less reliable are only rarely acceptable.
B: This has been done, based on program analysis, traces, and a whole
host of other techniques. Probably the best example based on program
analysis is
"Intrusion Detection via Static Analysis"
David Wagner and Drew Dean:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/ids-oakland01.ps
This is probably the nicest imply because their model does NOT have
false positives, only false negatives.
C: How to waltz through this "100%" protection:
"Mimicry Attaks on Host-Based Intrusion Detection"
David Wagner and Paolo Soto:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/mimicry.pdf
--
Nicholas C. Weaver nweaver (at) cs.berkeley (dot) edu [email concealed]
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