BugTraq
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 18 2003 10:16PM
Theo de Raadt (deraadt cvs openbsd org) (3 replies)
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 19 2003 08:12PM
Mark Tinberg (mtinberg securepipe com)
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 19 2003 06:38AM
Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (2 replies)
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 19 2003 07:12PM
Mariusz Woloszyn (emsi ipartners pl)
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 19 2003 04:17PM
Anil Madhavapeddy (anil recoil org)
On Mon, Aug 18, 2003 at 11:38:46PM -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote:
>
> ProPolice does not protect functions containing arrays of length 7 or
> less. We don't know what other cases exist in which ProPolice fails to
> protect. This kind of risk exists precisely because of the design choice
> that gives ProPolice its multi-architecture capability: putting the
> protection way up high in the compiler. This creates the potential for
> later stages of GCC to optimize away the security checks, or move them
> so far away from relevant code that they are no longer effective. When
> you choose ProPolice, you choose CPU portability over security.

You're correct that OpenBSD/ProPolice does not protect buffers of length 7
or less, but your analysis appears to be completely wrong.

It's just a simple #define SUSPICIOUS_BUF_SIZE, and looks to be there for
performance reasons. If you run with -Wstack-protector, PP will warn
explicitly when it skips a too-small buffer. If you are feeling particularly
paranoid and don't mind the performance hit, just crank the define down
and recompile GCC.

It certainly isn't gcc optimising away the checks, or anything to do with
architecture.

--
Anil Madhavapeddy http://anil.recoil.org
University of Cambridge http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk

[ reply ]
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 19 2003 01:55AM
Glynn Clements (glynn clements virgin net)


 

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