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BugTraq
Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 05:26PM Mariusz Woloszyn (emsi ipartners pl) (6 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 11:27PM Shaun Clowes (shaun securereality com au) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 15 2003 06:48PM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 17 2003 11:09PM Shaun Clowes (shaun securereality com au) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 17 2003 10:42PM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (2 replies) Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness Aug 21 2003 02:00AM Bob Rogers (rogers-bt2 rgrjr dyndns org) (1 replies) Re: Heterogeneity as a form of obscurity, and its usefulness Aug 22 2003 03:56AM Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 18 2003 06:07PM Mark Handley (M Handley cs ucl ac uk) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 07:37PM Theo de Raadt (deraadt cvs openbsd org) (3 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 09:14PM Gerhard Strangar (gerhard brue net) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 09:43PM Theo de Raadt (deraadt cvs openbsd org) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 07:17PM Timo Sirainen (tss iki fi) (1 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 14 2003 06:47PM Jedi/Sector One (j pureftpd org) (2 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 15 2003 09:41AM Peter Busser (peter trusteddebian org) (2 replies) Re: Buffer overflow prevention Aug 16 2003 01:36AM Mark Tinberg (mtinberg securepipe com) (2 replies) |
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Privacy Statement |
> >Seems to me that obscurity is the *only* defence against exploits for
> >unpublished/unpatched vulnerabilities that are spreading in the cracker
> >community; if you can avoid being a target, by whatever means, then you
> >are ahead of the game.
> >
> Now that is just not true. All of the technologies in the previous
> thread (StackGuard, PointGuard, ProPolice, PaX, W^X, etc.) have some
> capacity to resist attacks based on unpublished/unpatched
> vulnerabilities. That is their entire purpose.
Likewise, the worm research has been focusing on how to automatically
detect, analyze, and respond to a new worm or similar threat. For
some classes (eg, Scanning worms like Slammer, blaster, code red,
etc), this appears quite doable.
So the likely viable worm defenses ideally should deal with 0 day
worms, which means stopping a new vulnerability contained in a new
worm.
--
Nicholas C. Weaver nweaver (at) cs.berkeley (dot) edu [email concealed]
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