<bugtraq (at) zapthedingbat (dot) com [email concealed]> wrote:
> By opening a window using the http://user@domain nomenclature an
> attacker can hide the real location of the page by including a 0x01
> character after the "@" character. ...
"before" methinks (as in your example!).
> ... Internet Explorer doesn't display the
> rest of the URL making the page appear to be at a different domain.
>
> # POC ##########
> http://www.zapthedingbat.com/security/ex01/vun1.htm
In fact, it seems that the URL-encoding is unnecessary (although how
reliably a page with an 0x01 character in it will be transported around
I'm not sure and it would likely be less useful for attempted exploits
transmitted via Email). So, anyone busily setting up further filters
in any sanitizing procedures for incoming HTML should not only be
looking for "%01" but straight 0x01 characters (although reliably
interpreting this when combined with scripting -- see below -- might be
a headache).
Oddly (or not, depending on your experience with, and expectations of,
inconsistencies in MS products) this does not seem to work in a
straight http-equiv=refresh situation. Odder yet (or not, depending on
your experience with, and expectations of, inconsistencies in MS
products) it does work with http-equiv=refresh if you script the
writing of the refresh statement. Go figure!
I don't have ready access to a suitable server config at the moment to
try the variations with server-side redirects -- anyone??
> By opening a window using the http://user@domain nomenclature an
> attacker can hide the real location of the page by including a 0x01
> character after the "@" character. ...
"before" methinks (as in your example!).
> ... Internet Explorer doesn't display the
> rest of the URL making the page appear to be at a different domain.
>
> # POC ##########
> http://www.zapthedingbat.com/security/ex01/vun1.htm
In fact, it seems that the URL-encoding is unnecessary (although how
reliably a page with an 0x01 character in it will be transported around
I'm not sure and it would likely be less useful for attempted exploits
transmitted via Email). So, anyone busily setting up further filters
in any sanitizing procedures for incoming HTML should not only be
looking for "%01" but straight 0x01 characters (although reliably
interpreting this when combined with scripting -- see below -- might be
a headache).
Oddly (or not, depending on your experience with, and expectations of,
inconsistencies in MS products) this does not seem to work in a
straight http-equiv=refresh situation. Odder yet (or not, depending on
your experience with, and expectations of, inconsistencies in MS
products) it does work with http-equiv=refresh if you script the
writing of the refresh statement. Go figure!
I don't have ready access to a suitable server config at the moment to
try the variations with server-side redirects -- anyone??
Regards,
Nick FitzGerald
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