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Cyrus IMSP remote root vulnerability
Dec 15 2003 06:55PM
Felix Lindner (felix lindner nruns com)
http://www.nruns.com/ security (at) nruns (dot) com [email concealed]
Vendor: Andrew Systems Group, Carnegie Mellon (cmu.edu)
Product: Cyrus IMSP
Vulnerability: Buffer overflow in address book handling
Affected Releases: 1.4, 1.5a6, 1.6a3, 1.7
NOT Affected Releases: -
CERT tracking: VU#933878
08.12.2003 Initial notification
08.12.2003 Rob Siemborski answers
08.12.2003 Rob Siemborski sends a patch
09.12.2003 n.runs tests the patch and finds it to be correct
09.12.2003 CERT VU# assigned
12.12.2003 Rob Siemborski sends the new versions
15.12.2003 public release
Cyrus IMSP is a implementation of the IMSP protocol .
"The Internet Message Support Protocol (IMSP) is designed to support
the provision of mail in a medium to large scale operation. It is
intended to be used as a companion to the IMAP4 protocol [IMAP4],
providing services which are either outside the scope of mail access
or which pertain to environments which must run more than one IMAP4
server in the same mail domain. The services that IMSP provides are
extended mailbox management, configuration options, and address
There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the Cyrus IMSPd.
The vulnerability can be triggered before authentication. The IMSP
daemon is required to run as root.
In the function abook_dbname, a sprintf() call takes place. The
function takes two char pointers (dbname and name), which are later
used in the sprintf() call:
sprintf(dbname, abookdb, ownerlen, name, name);
abookdb is defined as
static char abookdb = "user/%.*s/abook.%s";
Several functions in the code use abook_dbname() and supply a local
char buffer of 256 bytes as first argument to the function. Since the
second argument "name" is controlled by the user in serveral protocol
messages , a remotely exploitable buffer overflow is created.
n.runs has a prove of concept exploit for the issue discussed.
Andrew Systems Group has released new versions. Older versions are
no longer supported.
Bug found by Felix Lindner and Michael Guenther of n.runs GmbH.
Additional credits to Steffen Weinreich for support during research.
Greets to Halvar, Johnny Cyberpunk, Nicolas Fischbach, all@EEye
The information provided is released by n.runs "as is" without warranty
of any kind. n.runs disclaims all warranties, either express or implied,
expect for the warranties of merchantability. In no event shall n.runs
liable for any damages whatsever including direct, indirect, incidental,
consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if
n.runs has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
Distribution or reproduction of the information is provided that the
advisory is not modified in any way.
Copyright 2003 n.runs. All rights reserved.
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