BugTraq
RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 03:45PM
Thomas Zehetbauer (thomasz hostmaster org) (13 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 29 2004 08:39PM
Pavel Levshin (flicker mariinsky ru) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 03 2004 01:26AM
David F. Skoll (dfs roaringpenguin com)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 29 2004 12:18PM
Sascha Wilde (wilde agentur-sec de)
RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling) Jan 29 2004 12:00PM
Andrey G. Sergeev (AKA Andris) (andris aernet ru) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: content-filter and AV notifications (Was: Re: RFC: virus handling) Feb 03 2004 04:07PM
Peter J. Holzer (hjp wsr ac at)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 11:11PM
Pavel Kankovsky (peak argo troja mff cuni cz)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 10:00PM
John Fitzgibbon (fitz jfitz com) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 03 2004 05:09PM
Dave Clendenan (dave dave clendenan ca) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 03 2004 10:59PM
Volker Kuhlmann (list0570 paradise net nz)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 09:26PM
Craig Morrison (craig fishpalace org) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 03 2004 11:11AM
James C. Slora Jr. (Jim Slora phra com)
Re: virus handling Jan 28 2004 08:33PM
Mike Healan (mike spywareinfo com)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 08:06PM
Dave Aronson (spamtrap secfocus dja mailme org)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 07:08PM
Daniele Orlandi (daniele orlandi com)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 06:48PM
Piotr KUCHARSKI (chopin sgh waw pl)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 06:24PM
Patrick Proniewski (patpro patpro net) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 03 2004 08:55PM
Matthew Dharm (mdharm one-eyed-alien net) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 04 2004 01:44PM
Ben Wheeler (b wheeler ulcc ac uk) (1 replies)
Re: RFC: virus handling Feb 05 2004 12:52PM
Shawn McMahon (smcmahon eiv com)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 06:07PM
Jeremy Mates (jmates sial org) (1 replies)
Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 03 2004 12:11PM
Larry Seltzer (larry larryseltzer com) (3 replies)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 05 2004 12:18PM
Andreas Marx (amarx gega-it de)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 04 2004 02:31PM
Valdis Kletnieks vt edu (2 replies)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 05 2004 08:33AM
Stephen Samuel (samuel bcgreen com) (1 replies)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 06 2004 10:07PM
Valdis Kletnieks vt edu (1 replies)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 08 2004 01:01PM
Shawn McMahon (smcmahon eiv com)
RE: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 04 2004 02:41PM
Larry Seltzer (larry larryseltzer com) (1 replies)
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 04 2004 05:11PM
Valdis Kletnieks vt edu
Re: Hysterical first technical alert from US-CERT Feb 04 2004 12:27PM
Philip Rowlands (phr doc ic ac uk)
Re: RFC: virus handling Jan 28 2004 05:54PM
3APA3A (3APA3A SECURITY NNOV RU) (1 replies)
getting rid of outbreaks and spam (junk) [WAS: Re: RFC: virus handling] Feb 03 2004 09:11AM
Gadi Evron (ge linuxbox org) (4 replies)
Re: getting rid of outbreaks and spam (junk) Feb 04 2004 08:07PM
James Riden (j riden massey ac nz)
Re: getting rid of outbreaks and spam (junk) [WAS: Re: RFC: virus handling] Feb 04 2004 08:04PM
Georg Schwarz (geos epost de)
Re: getting rid of outbreaks and spam (junk) [WAS: Re: RFC: virus handling] Feb 04 2004 06:27AM
der Mouse (mouse Rodents Montreal QC CA)
Re: getting rid of outbreaks and spam (junk) [WAS: Re: RFC: virus handling] Feb 03 2004 11:07PM
James A. Thornton (jamest u-238 infinite1der org)


On Tue, 3 Feb 2004, Gadi Evron wrote:

> 3. I think we look at the whole problem in the wrong way, allow me to
> elaborate:
>
> The AV industry is built on reaction rather than prevention. Adding
> new signatures is still the #1 tool in the fight against malware.
>
> With spam and mass mailers clogging the tubes, causing us all to waste
> money on bigger tubes, as well as our time dealing with the annoyance
> (more money), shouldn't the problem be solved there (at the main tubes
> themselves) rather than at the end user's desktop?
>
> If backbones filtered the top-10 current outbreaks, with non-intrusive
> means such as for example running MD5 checksum checks against
> attachments, or whatever other way - wouldn't it be better? True, it
> may cause a cry of "the government spies on us, but with the current
> economic troubles outbreaks cause, can we really use that excuse
> anymore? Doesn't the police regulate speeding?

Filtering at the backbone level is contraditory to 3.3, as the provider
would have already sent the data out their Global ( or even National )
Peer so they're already paying for the increased data on the pipes. Also,
the feat of filtering every packet, MD5'ing it, and dropping it would be
an engineering marvel. (De-capsulation and re-encapsulation alone would
require vasts amounts of processing power for that much data. ) Not to
mention the end user resubmitting his request once he realizes that the
recipient never got the message the first time.

>
> If I were to take the conspiratorial side, perhaps backbones like it
> when people pay for tubes they don't need, which are used to deliver
> 90% junk.
>
> Nobody wants to deal with "you are reading my mail!" or with "sorry,
> now people will pay for smaller tubes", perhaps even at the ISP level
> - "why should I pay for more filtering when it isn't demanded of me?".
>
> They are right, it isn't currently demanded of them.
>
> I would like to refer you to SpamCop (when it comes to spam) or
> MessageLabs (for malware), it works. But you need to pay to get (most
> of) their services.
>

There ARE ISP/provider level AV/Filtering products out that alleviate most
of the sources of unwanted incoming and outgoing mail traffic. Of course,
purchasing and implementation is up to the provider...

_____________________________________________________________________
James A. Thornton UNIX System Administrator Atlanta, GA

GnuPG fingerprint: 5A4E FF38 F255 78D2 EABC 63A5 6248 FBAB 293F EC0A

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