BugTraq
Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 09 2004 09:23PM
Michal Medvecky (M Medvecky sh cvut cz) (3 replies)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 10 2004 12:07AM
Felipe Franciosi (ozzybugt terra com br)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 09 2004 10:24PM
Michael Kjorling (michael kjorling com)
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On Feb 9 2004, M.Medvecky (at) sh.cvut (dot) cz [email concealed] wrote:

> share:/data/share# ls -l a
> - -rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 11716 Feb 8 12:39 a
>
> misko@slovakia:~$ ls -l pokus/a
> - -rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 11716 2004-02-08 12:39 pokus/a
> misko@slovakia:~$ pokus/a
> root@slovakia:~# id
> uid=0(root) gid=0(root) skupiny=1000(misko),0(root),29(audio),100(users),1034(mtr),1035(333)
> root@slovakia:~#
>
> Confirmed to work on all 2.6.x kernels, not confirmed on 2.4.x.

How is this affected by setting the nosuid and/or nodev options on the smbfs
file systems in /etc/fstab? Unless it is still exploitable, this would seem
like the expected, albeit perhaps not always desirable, behavior to me at
least. If it is still exploitable with those options set, it's a bug that
should be corrected in the smbfs code, as it then doesn't clear security-
related bits when instructed to do so.

A more appropriate fix than always clearing the s[ug]id and device bits on
SMB file systems might be to make any network file systems nosuid,nodev by
default, forcing the administrator to manually override this on any network
file systems where such functionality for some reason is required. There
would certainly be fewer side effects that cannot be worked around if needed.

I don't have any Samba servers on my network so I cannot really try this.

Also, I do not think that I would characterize this as a "local root
vulnerability", but rather improper use of the s[ug]id bits on network file
systems. You still need to convince root on the host sharing the file to make
a binary setuid root, and on the host you are mounting the attack from to
allow setuid binaries to be executed indiscriminately from a networked file
system. Either one may be feasible, but both?

- --
Michael Kjörling - michael (at) kjorling (dot) com [email concealed] - SM0YBY QTH JO89XI ^..^
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[ reply ]
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 09 2004 10:03PM
Seth Arnold (sarnold wirex com) (2 replies)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 10 2004 07:42AM
Frank Louwers (frank openminds be) (2 replies)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 12 2004 12:50AM
Darren Reed (avalon caligula anu edu au)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 11 2004 09:42PM
Urban Widmark (urban teststation com)
Re: Samba 3.x + kernel 2.6.x local root vulnerability Feb 09 2004 11:07PM
Patrick J. Volkerding (security slackware com)


 

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