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BugTraq
Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 16 2004 11:26AM R Armiento (rar_bt armiento se) (7 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 17 2004 05:27PM Joel Eriksson (je-secfocus bitnux com) (3 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 18 2004 08:57PM Jason Coombs (jasonc science org) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 18 2004 06:52PM PSE-L mail professional org (Sean Straw / PSE) RE: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 17 2004 02:18PM Aaron Cake (aaron vltpm com) (1 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 21 2004 01:23PM Chris Brown (chris wavetex com) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 17 2004 11:28AM David F. Skoll (dfs roaringpenguin com) (4 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? (silently dropping messages) Jun 22 2004 02:20PM Martin Maèok (martin macok underground cz) (2 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? (silently dropping messages) Jun 24 2004 07:15AM Valdis Kletnieks vt edu Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? (silently dropping messages) Jun 23 2004 12:53AM David F. Skoll (dfs roaringpenguin com) (2 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? (silently dropping messages) Jun 23 2004 10:46PM der Mouse (mouse Rodents Montreal QC CA) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 20 2004 01:52PM Luca Berra (bluca comedia it) (3 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 24 2004 08:32PM Michael A. Dickerson (mikey singingtree com) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 23 2004 05:07PM PSE-L mail professional org (Sean Straw / PSE) (2 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 24 2004 07:42PM The Fungi (fungi yuggoth org) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 24 2004 05:44PM John Fitzgibbon (bugtraq jfitz com) (1 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 25 2004 05:08AM PSE-L mail professional org (Sean Straw / PSE) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 19 2004 02:56PM Kyle Wheeler (kyle-bugtraq memoryhole net) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 19 2004 12:49AM Jon Fiedler (jmf9 cwru edu) (1 replies) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 19 2004 01:29AM David F. Skoll (dfs roaringpenguin com) RE: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 17 2004 08:26AM Hamlesh Motah (admin hamlesh com) Re: Is predictable spam filtering a vulnerability? Jun 17 2004 08:21AM Ilya Sher (ilya79 actcom net il) |
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Privacy Statement |
>I agree with silently discarding viruses, because false-positives are
>practically unknown.
Well, there are a LOT of crummy A/V approaches out there, and I've received
more than one bounce based on something flagging a message as a virus
because there's some keyphrase in it. In fact, this is why most of the A/V
notification lists ceased providing descriptions of viruses and instead
just provide a link to their website where you can get detail -- because
far too many cheezeball "virus" solutions triggered off of simple keyword
phrases.
> > IHMO 1: If your filter decides the message is not worth a delivery
> > it's not worth a bounce too.
>
>That's not correct. I've had many legitimate emails rejected by overzealous
>spam filtering.
The same folks who write the overzealous spam filtering generally break a
number of RFCs anyway. Sending their notifications replies to the From:
address instead of the envelope sender for instance. Or rejecting messages
from a contact which has regularly correspondend with their user. Sending
messages forged to be FROM the intended recipient (or, in some cases,
forged to be from the original message author).
> > IMHO 2: If your filter does not do the job of filtering messages well
> > and bounces back, it is just distributing his work to others
> > and deserves to be repaired/changed or blacklisted (firewalled
> > out by others).
>
>A 5xx failure code is a lot more friendly than actually generating a DSN.
Well, you're causing the sending/relaying host to generate the DSN. Quite
possibly back to some sod who has been joe-jobbed.
>Proposals like SPF can help a little.
On the surface, SPF seems really nifty, but it poses a significant
implementation issue for listserves and forwarding services alike.
>One good thing is that spammers often use ratware that ignores
>failure codes. So a 5xx return code does *not* elicit a
>DSN, whereas having your anti-spam box actually generate a DSN
>is obviously bad.
You're back to the problem that the Anti-Spam solutions are often
implemented post-SMTP, so those using them have the option of either
ditching the message or generating an (often undesired) DSN. The anti-spam
and virus solutions which are integrated at the SMTP level pose DOS issues
for the mailhost because the message MUST be identified as spam or not spam
right then and there.
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