Toomas Soome wrote:

> Lionel Ferette wrote:
>
>> Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not
>> only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart
>> cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The
>> conclusion has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC,
>> and the attacker has means to install software on the system (through
>> directed viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
>>
>> The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered
>> using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack
>> raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms,
>> because there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached
>> pin pad (at the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
>>
>
> at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement
> secured communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that
> widely in use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both
> PIN codes and passphrases...
>
> toomas

Perhaps I'm missing something here. As far as I can tell, no keys
located on the card were compromised, only the PIN was. Since this is a
two factor authentication system, possession of the PIN is of little
value without possession of the token itself.

Am I missing the point here?

regards,

-lee

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