OpenOffice World-Readable Temporary Files Disclose Files to Local Users

Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2004 23:52:18 -0400

Subject: http://www.openoffice.org/issues/show_bug.cgi?id=33357

Reporter: pmladek

OS: Linux

Version: OOo 1.1.2

Summary: Insecure permissions on temporary files at runtime

When OOo is started, a directory /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp is created, where

RAND is a 3 character random string.

The permissions of this directory allow other users (depending on the user's

umask) to 'cd' to this directory and list the contents.

Once a file is saved, a zipped file is created in /tmp/sv<RAND>.tmp and the

name of the file follows the same convention. The permissions of the file

allow others (depending on the user's umask) to read the content.

Due to this any user can grab sensitive information of someother user.

Steps to reproduce the problem:

1. Launch OpenOffice.

2. List /tmp contents. Locate the directory 'sv*.tmp'

3. Type in some contents in the document and save it.

4. List the contents of the directory /tmp/sv*.tmp/

5. Do not close OpenOffice. 'su' to a different user.

6. Copy the file under /tmp/sv*.tmp/ to home directory.

7. Use 'unzip' to unzip the files.

8. The file content.xml holds the data the user had just saved.

The workaround is to set more secure umask. The problem is that the users does

not know about it. Why should they need to set more strict umask if they save

its data in a directory which has the correct permissions. They do not expect

that there are any world-readable temporary data available somewhere on the system.

Also reported here http://securitytracker.com/id?1011205

Regards,

Jérôme ATHIAS

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