pressinfo (at) diebold (dot) com [email concealed] wrote:

> <>In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail (at) www.securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]>
>
> In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic
> record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting
> machine following an election. The results from each individual
> machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard
> election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official
> winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the
> election management software would be immediately discovered during
> this audit process, as this total would not match the true official
> total tabulated from each machine.

Something with a legitimate purpose may not always be used in a
legitimate fashion. If "legitimate" features exist which could pervert
the primary purpose of the system -- to accurately record and collate
votes -- and those features could forseeably be used in such a way with
the collusion of only a small number of individuals, then that system is
broken.

Your second point here has got nothing to do with security of the GEMS
software -- it's talking about election processes as a whole, of which
the software is only a part. The assumption in the design and
implementation of your voting machines and software should be that the
other parts of the process might *not* work, not that they are perfect
and will excuse any flaws in your system.

Craig.

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