BugTraq
RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Sep 23 2004 10:21AM
Jeremy Epstein (jeremy epstein webmethods com) (7 replies)
RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Sep 27 2004 06:25PM
Greg A. Woods (woods weird com) (1 replies)
Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Sep 28 2004 03:38AM
Marco S Hyman (marc snafu org) (2 replies)
Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes Sep 28 2004 08:20PM
Simon (lists sime org uk) (3 replies)
Marco S Hyman wrote:
>
> All I demand from a voting system is that votes can be voter verified.
> That's not true of ANY voting machine regardless of who writes the code
> unless there is a hard copy audit trail. If there is a hard copy audit
> trail then it doesn't make any difference who wrote the code.

How do you know that the software generating the audit trail is playing
fair if it's closed source?

Sometimes, IMHO, there's just no alternative to pen and paper. Surely
the manual method of ticking a box and having multiple human vote
counters checking ballots is the best option going, even if it is more
expensive. (I confess I've no idea what costs are involved either way.)

[ reply ]
RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Sep 27 2004 11:25AM
Paul Wouters (paul xtdnet nl) (2 replies)
Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Sep 28 2004 12:08AM
Adam Shostack (adam homeport org)
Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Sep 28 2004 12:00AM
Crispin Cowan (crispin immunix com) (1 replies)
RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Sep 29 2004 08:05AM
David Schwartz (davids webmaster com)


 

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