> How do you know that the software generating the audit trail is
> playing fair if it's closed source?
This is where the "voter-verified" part of "voter-verified audit trail"
comes from. The software produces a visible hardcopy of the voter's
choice, which the voter has a chance to inspect before it is deposited
in a ballot box. Assuming reasonable precautions are taken to prevent
physical tampering with these boxes, the software record of the votes
cast can be compared at any time with the paper record - and the paper
record would have primacy in the event of any discrepancy.
> How do you know that the software generating the audit trail is
> playing fair if it's closed source?
This is where the "voter-verified" part of "voter-verified audit trail"
comes from. The software produces a visible hardcopy of the voter's
choice, which the voter has a chance to inspect before it is deposited
in a ballot box. Assuming reasonable precautions are taken to prevent
physical tampering with these boxes, the software record of the votes
cast can be compared at any time with the paper record - and the paper
record would have primacy in the event of any discrepancy.
Colm
--
Colm Buckley / colm (at) tuatha (dot) org [email concealed] / www.colm.buckley.name / +353 87 2469146
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