> Regarding local versus remote, look at it this way: You have a 100%
> secure system. Then you install NASM. Now a user FROM THE NETWORK can
> send you some tainted assembly code for you to assemble and he can
> compromise your account.
That's nonsense. If you have /bin/sh installed, I can send you a shell
script FROM THE NETWORK that will give me root access if you run it.
Therefore, every UNIX system on Earth has a remote hole, according to
your definition.
> Now in regards to full disclosure, I think you should all be happy
> that we bothered to tell you all about these exploits. We could
> have selfishly used them to compromise machines, but instead we
> wrote them up and mailed them off to the users and the authors!
Could you have? How, pray tell, would you compromise a machine with
the NASM exploit? Even if you have a local account, the NASM exploit
lets you run arbitrary code as... yourself. Big deal.
> Regarding local versus remote, look at it this way: You have a 100%
> secure system. Then you install NASM. Now a user FROM THE NETWORK can
> send you some tainted assembly code for you to assemble and he can
> compromise your account.
That's nonsense. If you have /bin/sh installed, I can send you a shell
script FROM THE NETWORK that will give me root access if you run it.
Therefore, every UNIX system on Earth has a remote hole, according to
your definition.
> Now in regards to full disclosure, I think you should all be happy
> that we bothered to tell you all about these exploits. We could
> have selfishly used them to compromise machines, but instead we
> wrote them up and mailed them off to the users and the authors!
Could you have? How, pray tell, would you compromise a machine with
the NASM exploit? Even if you have a local account, the NASM exploit
lets you run arbitrary code as... yourself. Big deal.
--
David.
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