Florian Weimer wrote:
> * John Richard Moser:
>
>
>>I'm no security expert, so bear with me here; I just kind of tripped
>>over something interesting that I'd like to ask about.
>>
>>I was blogging about DEP based on MS' technical documentation and came
>>up with a quick and dirty way to use a buffer overflow (we'll assume no
>>stackguarding, or that you found a way around it i.e. using a format
>>string bug) to kick DEP out of the way. This is pretty much based on
>>the PaX documentation and justification for mprotect() restrictions.
>
>
> Look for return-into-libc exploits. There are quite a few.
>
> Even with non-executable stack and heap, no one guarantees that buffer
> overflows aren't exploitable. Randomization of load addresses is
> intended to provide additional protection, but the number of available
> bits is fairly low on 32 bit machines (problably less than 16). I
> don't know if Windows is doing it.
>
I don't see anything in the docs about it, but I don't have XP (I think
I have an XP license. . . yeah here it is, taped to the bottom of my
laptop; but I don't have a CD, and don't feel like finding . . what are
those things. . . a torrent of it)
PaX does pretty nice randomization. I think 15/16 for heap and stack
and 24 for mmap(), though I could be overshooting the 24. I'm on amd64
so I can't just run paxtest and see; though I could read the source code.
Also, there appears to be a UUDecode() function available! :) Looks
like you might be able to do attacks with NULLs in the shellcode and such?
Oh well, I guess this is just redundant white noise then; I was just
struck dumb a bit when it appeared that HW-DEP provided nothing in the
way of real protection; I'm too used to security enhancements being real.
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Florian Weimer wrote:
> * John Richard Moser:
>
>
>>I'm no security expert, so bear with me here; I just kind of tripped
>>over something interesting that I'd like to ask about.
>>
>>I was blogging about DEP based on MS' technical documentation and came
>>up with a quick and dirty way to use a buffer overflow (we'll assume no
>>stackguarding, or that you found a way around it i.e. using a format
>>string bug) to kick DEP out of the way. This is pretty much based on
>>the PaX documentation and justification for mprotect() restrictions.
>
>
> Look for return-into-libc exploits. There are quite a few.
>
> Even with non-executable stack and heap, no one guarantees that buffer
> overflows aren't exploitable. Randomization of load addresses is
> intended to provide additional protection, but the number of available
> bits is fairly low on 32 bit machines (problably less than 16). I
> don't know if Windows is doing it.
>
I don't see anything in the docs about it, but I don't have XP (I think
I have an XP license. . . yeah here it is, taped to the bottom of my
laptop; but I don't have a CD, and don't feel like finding . . what are
those things. . . a torrent of it)
PaX does pretty nice randomization. I think 15/16 for heap and stack
and 24 for mmap(), though I could be overshooting the 24. I'm on amd64
so I can't just run paxtest and see; though I could read the source code.
Also, there appears to be a UUDecode() function available! :) Looks
like you might be able to do attacks with NULLs in the shellcode and such?
Oh well, I guess this is just redundant white noise then; I was just
struck dumb a bit when it appeared that HW-DEP provided nothing in the
way of real protection; I'm too used to security enhancements being real.
- --
All content of all messages exchanged herein are left in the
Public Domain, unless otherwise explicitly stated.
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