BugTraq
International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 08 2005 04:39AM
Brandon Kovacs (liljoker771 gmail com) (2 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 09 2005 03:31PM
Will Kamishlian (will will-k com) (1 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 10 2005 11:24AM
Peter J. Holzer (hjp wsr ac at) (1 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 11 2005 07:07PM
Scott Gifford (sgifford suspectclass com) (2 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 11 2005 10:44PM
Neil W Rickert rickert+bt (at) cs.niu (dot) edu [email concealed] (rickert+bt cs niu edu) (2 replies)
RE: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 13 2005 12:32AM
David Schwartz (davids webmaster com) (1 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 15 2005 08:12AM
Vincent Archer (var deny-all com) (2 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 12 2005 04:03AM
Scott Gifford (sgifford suspectclass com) (1 replies)
Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs. Feb 15 2005 07:00PM
bkfsec (bkfsec sdf lonestar org) (2 replies)
Scott Gifford wrote:

>
>My understanding of the business model was similar to an organization
>like the Better Business Bureau; the customers are the ones paying to
>be certified, because being certified gives them some extra
>legitimacy. BBB is able to do this because they have built up public
>trust; essentially they're a reseller of public trust. If they do a
>poor job of screening, it reflects poorly on their customers, and
>trust in them is reduced.
>
>CAs serve a similar function. If they have no public trust, what do
>they have to sell? Surely people don't pay them 50-100 bucks for the
>5 seconds of CPU time it takes to sign the certificate...
>
>
>
The difference between CAs and the BBB is that the BBB is well known and
highly accountable. CAs are not necessarily.

There is no widely screened public discussion or understanding of the
function of CAs. The accepted root CAs do their jobs on the browser
entirely in the background. Their "seal of approval" is considered
implicit by the lack of a message at all.

Therefore, when a CA screws up, all the CA has to do is say "Mea Culpa -
it wasn't that way when we approved them." and they wash their hands of
it and only a very small percentage of people (who are more likely to be
labelled paranoid than listened to by the masses) are ever actually
talking about it.

The same is not true of the BBB and as such the argument that there's a
valid trust relationship there is invalid. There is no relationship
between the end user and the CA in the first place, nevermind a trusted one.

-Barry

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