On Wed, May 11, 2005 at 01:08:56PM +0200, Paul Starzetz wrote:
> Hi,
>
> since it became clear from the discussion in January about the uselib()
> vulnerability, that the Linux community prefers full, non-embargoed
> disclosure of kernel bugs, I release full details right now. However to
> follows at least some of the responsable disclosure rules, no exploit code will be
> released. Instead, only a proof-of-concept code is released to demonstrate
> the vulnerability.

<snip>

And here's a patch for 2.6 that is completly untested. I'll work on
testing it today and if it works, we will release a new 2.6.11.y release
with this fix in it.

thanks,

greg k-h

Subject: possibly fix Linux kernel ELF core dump privilege elevation

As noted by Paul Starzetz

references CAN-something-I-need-to-go-look-up...

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh (at) suse (dot) de [email concealed]>

---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- gregkh-2.6.orig/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-05-11 00:03:45.000000000 -0700
+++ gregkh-2.6/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-05-11 00:09:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
}

/* Populate argv and envp */
- p = current->mm->arg_start;
+ p = current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->arg_start;
while (argc-- > 0) {
size_t len;
__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, argv++);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@
static int fill_psinfo(struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo, struct task_struct *p,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
- int i, len;
+ unsigned int i, len;

/* first copy the parameters from user space */
memset(psinfo, 0, sizeof(struct elf_prpsinfo));

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