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BugTraq
RE: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Mar 30 2006 09:08PM Geo. (geoincidents nls net) (2 replies) RE: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Mar 31 2006 05:38PM gboyce (gboyce badbelly com) (3 replies) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 03 2006 04:34PM Simon Boulet (simon nostalgeek com) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 02 2006 07:40AM Anton Ivanov (arivanov sigsegv cx) (1 replies) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 04 2006 02:54AM Tim (tim-security sentinelchicken org) (1 replies) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 05 2006 05:13AM Ross Wheeler (rossw albury net au) RE: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Mar 31 2006 06:27PM Geo. (geoincidents nls net) (1 replies) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 03 2006 11:12PM Jim Pingle (jim hpcisp com) (1 replies) Re: recursive DNS servers DDoS as a growing DDoS problem Apr 05 2006 06:11AM Erwan David (Erwan David trusted-logic fr) |
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Privacy Statement |
--On den 30 mars 2006 16.08.51 -0500 "Geo." <geoincidents (at) nls (dot) net [email concealed]> wrote:
> Don't you think creating a control point like that is dangerous?
> Especially dangerous when it's DNS which runs virtually every function on
> the internet?
The control point is there already, as has been demonstrated by several
attacks on DNS data.
If we were to ignore the problem of open recursive servers, there would be
a rush to implement draconian, ineffective countermeasures like packet
filters. It would be a very bad thing, just like the stupid port 25 blocks
are. That must be avoided and the end-to-end capability of the Internet
must be preserved. (I think we are in agreement here.)
> It's not a conspiracy theory, it's fact, if you create a control like that
> someone is going to want to control it. I suggest only that we consider
> this along with everything else.
If you have these concerns, I suggest you work with the available,
standardised, implemented methods of verifying that DNS data is correct
(ie. DNSSEC and TSIG for various parts of the infrastructure.) instead of
pushing your head down in the sand even further believing TCP or open
access to the rest of the net would make some difference in credibility for
DNS messages. At least one TLD (se) has DNSSEC in production, large amounts
of european IP address space have it, courtesy of RIPE.
--
MÃ¥ns Nilsson Systems Specialist
+46 70 681 7204 cell KTHNOC
+46 8 790 6518 office MN1334-RIPE
Inside, I'm already SOBBING!
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