Amit Klein wrote:
> pdp (architect) wrote:
>> I will be very quick and just point to links where you can read about
>> this issue.
>>
>> It seams that PDF documents can execute JavaScript code for no
>> apparent reason by using the following template:
>>
>>
>> http://path/to/pdf/file.pdf#whatever_name_you_want=javascript:your_code_
here
>>
>>
>> You must understand that the attacker doesn't need to have write
>> access to the specified PDF document. In order to get an XSS vector
>> working you need to have a PDF file hosted on the target and that's
>> all about it. The rest is just a matter of your abilities and desires.
>>
> Amazing, and kudos to Sven Vetsch who found this.
>
Oops, seems that the credit went to the wrong guy. Actual credit go to
Stefano Di Paola, with contributions from Giorgio Fedon (IE Dos, UXSS
Analysis) and Elia Florio (Poc and Code Execution analysis).

BTW, one way to mitigate this is for the server, upon receiving a
request to file.pdf (without a valid query+cookie pair, see below), to
redirect it to file.pdf?token_query=X (where X is an unpredictable, high
entropy string) accompanied with a Set-Cookie header for a cookie named
say "token_cookie" with value X and short expiration period (e.g. 10
seconds). The browser will then respond with a request to
file.pdf?token_query=X with Cookie token_cookie=X. At this point, if the
server receives token_query==token_cookie, the server knows this is a
legit request (i.e. without fragment), and it can safely serve the PDF
resource.

I suppose this can be implemented easily as an Apache module/ISAPI/NSAPI
filters.

-Amit

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