For some commentary on this issue, this is one man's thoughts.

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0602.html#16

Tom

Hawk Corporation
ttevans (at) hawkcorp (dot) net [email concealed]
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-----Original Message-----
From: Darren Reed [mailto:avalon (at) caligula.anu.edu (dot) au [email concealed]]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2007 1:49 AM
To: Thierry (at) Zoller (dot) lu [email concealed]
Cc: bugtraq (at) securityfocus (dot) com [email concealed]
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Solaris telnet vulnberability - how many on your
network?

In some mail from Thierry Zoller, sie said:
>
> CDSC> real back doors are better
> I like that tautologie, "real backdoors", what makes a backdoor more
> real than another one ? Is it the coolness, the stealth ? Or is it
> simply the fact that it gives back door access ?

How about putting a backdoor into your C compiler such that it
generates "special code" when it recognises it is compiling
/bin/login that allows special access?

That doesn't show up in any code audit of /bin/login...

so you think about auditting the code that makes up the compiler..

where does the executable for that come from...

and so on back.

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