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BugTraq
Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 01:23PM MustLive (mustlive websecurity com ua) (2 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 02:16PM Susan Bradley (sbradcpa pacbell net) (3 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 06:07PM KF (lists) (kf_lists digitalmunition com) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 04:42PM nameless (my security lists gmail com) (2 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 07:39PM Susan Bradley (sbradcpa pacbell net) (2 replies) RE: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 08:13PM Mike Wilson (mwilson amedisys com) (2 replies) RE: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 17 2009 04:10PM Jim Harrison (Jim isatools org) RE: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 08:36PM Steve Quan (sq01 yorku ca) (1 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 09:09PM nameless (my security lists gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 08:05PM Daniel Hazelton (dhazelton enter net) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 06:11PM Ansgar Wiechers (bugtraq planetcobalt net) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 04:25PM Michael Scheidell (scheidell secnap net) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 01:37PM Jeremy Brown (0xjbrown41 gmail com) (1 replies) Re: Insufficient Authentication vulnerability in Asus notebook May 14 2009 03:02PM Mike Vasquez (mike vasquez gmail com) |
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Privacy Statement |
> Steve Quan wrote:
>> Is there something like su/sudo in the Windows world ? How do windows
>> administrators handle this (ie accountability) ?
>
> There is "runas".
Indeed. There's also a variety of third-party tools like SuperiorSU [1].
> There is no accountability with the local admin account. You can
> disable the account and use domain credentials, but when the domain
> isn't available, you're screwed, so it is a poor decision.
I wouldn't agree entirely. It depends on who is given the password for
the local administrator account. You only have no accountability if more
than one person knows that password.
[...]
> In regards to changing the Admin account name, why make it easy for
> the kiddiots? It is trivial for any of us to bypass this, right?
Please elaborate. What attack scenarios do you see that aren't mitigated
by a strong password? Besides, even if you change the login name, the
SID of the account (which is well-known) still remains the same.
[...]
> Changing the Administrator name is just another layer in the onion of
> your defensive strategy.
I entirely fail to see what additional security that will gain you, so
please explain.
[...]
> And I'm not trying to be a smart ass, but does anyone really use
> LM-hashes anymore?
I don't believe they're actually used by anyone anymore. However, the
use of LM-hashes is still enabled by default on any XP.
[1] http://www.stefan-kuhr.de/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=62&Itemid=73
Regards
Ansgar Wiechers
--
"The Mac OS X kernel should never panic because, when it does, it
seriously inconveniences the user."
--http://developer.apple.com/technotes/tn2004/tn2118.html
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